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I. THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH
A. Introduction
This paper provides a comparative framework to analyze the extent to
which five major democracies Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, Germany,
and France-incorporated the subject matter jurisdiction Articles of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute") through their
domestic legislative processes while ratifying the Rome Statute, and what, if
anything, the United States can interpret from the five distinct approaches. By
examining what deviations the states made from the wording in the Rome
Statute, how variant the deviations are, and what the rationale for such
variations are, a picture will emerge which could provide guidance to the United
States, were it to aspire to incorporate the Rome Statute crimes into the federal
criminal code, amend Title 18 of the United States Code, and thus assure United
States primacy over the International Criminal Court ("ICC") complementarity
jurisdiction. Through the use of comparative analysis, it is plausible to reason
whether it would be feasible for the United States to build off the examples,
close the gaps in the United States Code,' and ultimately ratify the Rome
Statute. There appears to be a balancing act inherent in the ratification of the
Rome Statute.2 On one hand, there is the Rome Statute itself which details the
requirements for incorporation into the ICC regime, the meaning and purpose
of which must be included in the domestic code of the ratifying states in order
to obtain jurisdiction over the ICC crimes.3 While, at the same time, there are
political and legal considerations all of which require the governments to
modify the wording of the Rome Statute's Articles to conform to the states'
individual circumstances. 4 However, too great a deviation from the meaning
1. See Douglass Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes within the Jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 421 (2001) (discussing the gaps in the federal
criminal code as they pertain to federal jurisdiction over Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War
Crimes).
2. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also Jennifer Schense &
Donald K.Piragoff, Commonalities and Differences in the Implementation of the Rome Statute, in NATIONAL
LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 245 (Matthias Neuner ed., 2003) (discussing the
differences of each state's approach depending on unique legal, constitutional and due process criteria).
3. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8 (covering the crimes of "Genocide," "War Crimes," and
"Crimes Against Humanity").
4. Id. The Rome Statute is therefore somewhat analogous to a model treaty in that the Articles do
not have to be incorporated verbatim into the domestic legal code of the ratifying state. The practical
impossibility of the exercise, due to the vastness of criminal codes worldwide, requires that some flexibility
be expected. The interesting question is how much flexibility will be allowed before the domestic statute falls
outside the meaning and purpose of the Rome Statute. It should prove very interesting to observe how the
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and purpose of the Rome Statute's Articles could produce a situation whereby
the applicability of the treaty would be called into question. The balancing act
between the intended purpose and meaning of the Rome Statute and the unique
domestic requirements could presumably be too great for some countries, and
subsequent ICC and domestic court decisions will analyze these instances as
they arise and the ICC jurisprudence matures. It would be reasonable to assume
that the ICC would take the unique circumstances of each country into
consideration when called upon to interpret the implementing legislation, in
essence, passing judgment over whether the state in question has the legal
capability to genuinely carry out an investigation or prosecution pursuant to
Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute.
The international community assembled through the auspices of the United
Nations in December of 1989' to voice its concern about worldwide impunity
for hostis humani generis,6 and began to conceptualize a permanent judicial
organ focused on the most heinous crimes that exist.7 Instead of fashioning ad
hoc tribunals for different instances of grave crimes that focus on specific
regions or conflicts, as was done in Rwanda, the Balkans, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, or even a hybrid court, and as we are currently witnessing in
young court handles the instances where certain countries have strayed too far outside the boundaries of the
Rome Statute. This scenario gives rise to many complex questions beginning with whether the state actually
ratified the treaty.
5. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 340-44 (2003); see also KRISTINA
MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATION 13
(2000).
6. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
7. Patrick Zahnd, How the International Criminal Court Should Help Implement International
Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HuMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 43 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International
Criminal Court In Historical Context, 99 ST. LOUIs-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 55; The preamble of the
Rome Statute states:
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security, and well-being of the
world, Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution
must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing
international cooperation, Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of
these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes....
Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to
establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with
the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole....
Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
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Cambodia, a more permanent solution was conceived, one which ultimately
became the constitutive agreement for the ICC known as the Rome Statute.
In June and July of 1998, plenipotentiaries from around the globe met in
Rome for five weeks with the single purpose of formulating a multilateral
agreement that would end impunity for the perpetrators of the most heinous
crimes, bringing the hope of justice to those who suffered and those who
continue to suffer, from the most wretched acts of humankind.9 To make the
multilateral treaty-drafting exercise even more difficult, it was ultimately
decided that no reservations were allowed to be lodged. l The disparate
ideologies that many states have had in the past to multilateral agreements were
generally quelled by their ability to register their disagreements with
reservations which are included in the treaty document. The Rome Statute was
to be different, however, and debates occurred regarding a state's ability to
lodge formal reservations," as is permitted by the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. 2 In the end, the states were left with lodging merely
understandings. 3 The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, with the
8. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
9. Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 55.
10. David J. Scheffer et al., Panel: The Foreign Affairs Consequences of America's Absence, 8
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 17, 39 (2003) (stating that "one of our great defeats in Rome, was the fact
that we failed to get a reservations clause into the treaty."); David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the
International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 84 (2002) (stating "[T]he United States opposed such
a prohibition prior to and during the Rome Conference."); see also Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 120
(stating plainly that no reservations are to be allowed; similar to the debate regarding treaties of this nature,
i.e., Convention against Torture, etc., the argument is posited that, how could anyone have a reservation about
the "clear illegality" of such acts.).
11. As a rule, no reservations may be made to the Rome Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art.
120. However, a state may declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute
for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes
referred to in Article 8 (War Crimes) when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on
its territory. Id. art. 124 (Transitional Provision). This provision is a compromise achieved by the Rome
Conference at the expense of ensuring that one state supported the Rome Statute. See generally HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1999). This compromise is justified by
the fact that the "group of like-minded states" succeeded in obtaining support in prohibiting the possibility
of making reservations to the Statute. Id. This compromise, being a result of very hot debates, is one of the
most important principles of the Statute. Id.; see also MERAB TURAVA, OPEN SOCIETY--GEORGIA
FOUNDATION, ANALYSIS OF COMPATIBILITY OF THE GEORGIAN LEGISLATION WITH THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2001), available at http://www.osgf.ge/interlaw/ICC -O0.htm (last visited
Oct. 7, 2005).
12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 19-21, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
336-7 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
13. The importance of noting the distinctions between the two is crucial. A reservation binds the
reserving states' obligations of a treaty with regard to all signatory states. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-120 (4th ed., 2003). An understanding merely creates legal obligations for the
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sixtieth ratifier at a seemingly unprecedented pace.' 4  Currently, there are
ninety-eight countries that have ratified the Rome Statute. 5
The Rome Statute was indeed an amalgam of the states' disparate ideo-
logies with a single purpose, to constitute a permanent forum for the inter-
national community to bring the worst of criminals to justice. The ICC was
going to be a place to end impunity for only the most heinous crimes. Many
states prior to ratifying the Rome Statute, including the United States, did not
have the domestic legal framework in place to either exercise jurisdiction at the
national court level, or their criminal codes were silent or incomplete with
regard to the underlying criminal offences. The necessity for legislation,
entitling states' domestic jurisdiction, so that their courts could be an appro-
priate forum was made evident in Rome. Germany had expressed the possibility
that the ICC may promote the beginning of a harmonization process of
international criminal law amongst states. 6 These gaps in jurisdiction have
allowed for the imperfect administration of justice and, in certain situations,
have not created mandatory activation ofjurisdiction or prosecutorial authority.
The Rome Statute was supposed to propose a cure for this inequality and be the
world's court for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggres-
sion.
Each state's ICC implementing legislation is ripe with political, legal, and
distinctive domestic concerns. By distinguishing the states' final legislative
products, the United States can begin to conceptualize not only what sections
of the Rome Statute have been modified through states' domestic legislation,
seeing what issues are generally in play, but also to see whether the United
States can replicate the dual successes of other democracies, protecting
individual national interests and becoming a member of the ICC regime.
Passing legislation which would incorporate Articles 5 through 8 of the
Rome Statute into the United States' federal criminal law would not mandate
United States cooperation with the ICC. Congress can propose atrocity crime
legislation which does not mention the Rome Statute or the ICC. The Rome
Statute is not a self-executing treaty and, therefore, would still require the
reserving state to its own treaty obligations. Id. Had the United States been able to lodge a reservation to the
Rome Statute, that accordingly did not defeat the object or purpose of the statute itself, ratification of the
Rome Statute might have already occurred. Id.
14. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; see also COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
STATE SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS CHART (2005),
http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2005) (containing
the most up to date tally of ratified states) [hereinafter SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS].
15. SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14 (The Dominican Republic ratified the Rome
Statute on May 13, 2005, bringing the total number of States that are parties to the Statute to 99; 139 States
are signatories).
16. Schense & Piragoff, supra note 2, at 249.
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advice and consent of the United States Senate and a presidential signature
before the United States would belong to the group of ratifying member states
and be subject to the demands of the court. 7
Only by passing criminal laws that would guarantee United States federal
courts jurisdiction over ICC crimes does the United States effectively protect its
national interests because, pursuant to Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute,
the United States would be willing and able to genuinely carry out the
investigation or prosecution. 8 This would effectively make the case initially
inadmissible to the ICC. Currently the United States is not technically capable
in all circumstances to supplant the ICC's jurisdiction and take full advantage
of complementarity.
Section II examines the domestic legislative attempts by five western
democracies to implement the Rome Statute. By focusing strictly on the
divergences from the text of the Rome Statute and any possible constitutional
impediments to implementation, certain reoccurring themes make themselves
evident. The United States can benefit from such an examination because the
issues that other democracies struggled with can be recognized as either unique
to the state in question or inherent to all constitutional democracies. As a result,
the dilemmas can be either avoided as unique to the state in question or the
solution can be approached in a similar fashion as the other successfully
implementing states.
Section III discusses United States' interests in and fears of the ICC
regime. Were the ICC to become, as the plenipotentiaries in Rome envisioned,
the world's court for atrocity crimes, there are succinct benefits to United States
participation. For example, the future administration of the court will not be
influenced directly by the United States, nor will the United States be able to
contribute to state parties' proposals for additional ICC subject matter
jurisdiction.
Section IV comparatively examines the approaches of the other states and
applies their individual experiences to the current state of United States law. It
is plausible to assume that many of the issues that arose during the
implementation processes of the various states would translate in some form or
other into issues which might arise, were the United States to attempt to
implement the Rome Statute.
Lastly, Section V examines the differing approaches of implementing
legislation of four states side-by-side with the Rome Statute. The annexes in
this section were collected by the author as an aid to the reader and is the
17. Malvina Halberstam, International Human Rights and Domestic Law Focusing on U.S. Law,
with some Reference to Israeli Law, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.L. 225,234 (2000).
18. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 17-18.
author's own effort at correlating the various national statutes with the Rome
Statute.
II. FIVE STATES' APPROACHES TO RATIFYING THE ROME STATUTE
A. Canada
Canada has the unique distinction of being the first country to adopt
comprehensive domestic legislation effectively ratifying the Rome Statute.' 9
The Canadian Parliament passed the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
Act ("CAHWCA") on June 29, 2000,20 and ratified the Rome Statute on July 7,
2000.21 Subsequently, the CAHWCA entered into force on October 23, 2000.22
Dissimilar to the United States process of treaty ratification, the Canadian
constitution mandates that any treaty obligation, in which Canada would like to
enter, must first be entirely legislated through the parliamentary process before
the treaty can be signed.23 It is for this reason that Canada did not sign the
Rome Statute before its parliament had the opportunity to fully legislate the
contents of the treaty.24
All of the ICC crimes were incorporated into Canadian domestic law under
the CAHWCA.25 Canada did more than merely incorporate the ICC crimes by
reference to the Rome Statute into its criminal code,26 which was done for a
couple of reasons that will be discussed. Canada went further and made the
CAHWCA more extensive by including, for example, retrospective jurisdic-
tion 27 and the crime of using chemical weapons," a crime which was absent
19. EUR. CONSULT. Ass., Progress Report by Canada and Appendix, Doc. No. 11 (2001)
[hereinafter Progress Report by Canada]; Darryl Robinson, Implementing International Crimes in National
Law: The Canadian Approach, in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 45-54
(Matthias Neuner ed., 2003).
20. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 24 (Can.) [hereinafter
CAHWCA]; Robinson, supra note 19, at 45.
21. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14.
22. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TABLE 1: IMPLEMENTING THE ROME STATUTE (2002),
http://hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/chartl.pdf.
23. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix
1985); see also Robinson, supra note 19, at 46.
24. SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14.
25. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8; CAHWCA, supra note 20, § 4.
26. CAHWCA, supra note 20, § 4.
27. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 11 (g) (Eng.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter].
28. See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal
Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2 (1999).
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from the Rome Statute.29 A state can take full advantage of the complementarity
jurisdiction and be in compliance with Articles 5 through 8 of the Rome Statute,
regarding the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, by
simply making reference to the Rome Statute Articles 5 through 8 in its imple-
menting legislation.30 Incorporating the Rome Statute's crimes by reference, as
the convention declares, does not impede the continued development of custo-
mary international law.3
Canada had previously focused its legislative competence on war crimes
and crimes against humanity.32 In 1987, the Canadian Parliament promulgated
domestic law to enable the state to prosecute war crimes and crimes against
humanity whether or not they occurred within Canadian territory.3 3 Previously,
Canadian jurisdiction was mostly based on territoriality.34 The extraterritoriality
of the 1987 law could extend globally with regard to the criminal acts, as long
as the alleged criminal was on Canadian territory and subject to Canadian law
and apprehension regardless of his/her nationality. 35 The reality of prosecuting
an individual based on the Canadian war crimes statute proved to be insufficient
and required additional legal framework to be incorporated for legitimacy
purposes. The Canadian Supreme Court in Regina v. Finta held that prosecu-
ting an individual in accordance with the 1987 law, for such a serious crime and
for one which contained such a grave stigma in the international community,
required that the prosecutor incorporate the international as well as the domestic
29. Elaina I. Kalivretakis, Are Nuclear Weapons Above the Law? A Look at the International
Criminal Court and the Prohibited Weapons Category, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 683, 686-87 (2001). The
crime of using chemical weapons covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention was in Article 8 of the Rome
Statute until the final week of the Rome Conference when it was decided to drop the provision in order to end
the negotiation standstill which had occurred between the Arab/developing countries, who wanted to include
the use of nuclear weapons in the Rome Statute, and those countries, of which the United States and Canada
were included, who wanted to include the use of chemical weapons. The negotiated compromise was to drop
all modem references to weapons based on treaty law. Therefore, it is not surprising that Canada went ahead
and included the provision in their implementing legislation.
30. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8 (The Rome Statute is arguably referencing established
customary international legal principles; those states that had not codified those crimes could do so by making
reference to the appropriate Articles in the Rome Statute).
31. Id. art. 10.
32. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 7 (3.71 H3.77) (1985) (§§ (3.76) and (3.77) repealed 2000)
(Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Criminal Code].
33. Id.
34. William Schabas, Canadian Implementing Legislation for the Rome Statute: Jurisdiction and
Defences, in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 35-44 (Matthias Neuner ed.,
2003); see also Canadian Criminal Code, supra note 32, § 6(2) (providing exceptions to the territorial
jurisdictional rule for extraordinary cases).
35. See Canadian Criminal Code, note 32; Schabas, supra note 34, at 35-44.
elements of the crime. 6 The bar which the Canadian Supreme Court set was
accordingly high, one which is plausibly too high for a prosecutor to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt."
With the Finta holding as a marker, Canada looked to its inclusion in the
ICC regime as not only a means to amend its criminal code but as an oppor-
tunity to integrate the lessons learned from Finta and include retrospective
jurisdiction." While Canada did not have to amend its constitution to incor-
porate the ICC crimes,39 it did decide to broaden the domestic reach of its courts
by utilizing the tool of retrospectivity which allows the Canadian courts to
prosecute an individual if the commission of the alleged crime was recognized
by customary international law at the time it was committed.4" In contrast,
Canada decided not to make the ICC crimes retroactive, as some provisions of
the Rome Statute are manifestations of the recent developments of customary
international law,41 possibly in an attempt to assure constitutional protections
and safeguards.
The CAHWCA provides its own definitions of the ICC crimes.42 These
definitions are, however, largely consistent with the Rome Statute. Compare the
two:
CAHWCA §4(3)
[G]enocide means an act or omission committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, an identifiable group of persons, as such,
that, at the time and in the place of its commission, constitutes
genocide according to customary international law or conventional
international law or by virtue of its being criminal according to the
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations,
whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the
time and in the place of its commission.43
36. Regina v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Eng.).
37. Id.; Robinson, supra note 19, at 47.
38. Finta, I S.C.R. at 701.
39. CAHWCA, supra note 20, § 4(3) & 6(3); Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8.
40. See id. § 6 & 7(5); Section 6(1) states "Every person who, either before or afier the coming into
force of this section, commits outside Canada..." and Section 7(5) states "Where an act or omission
constituting an offense under this section occurred before the coming into force of this section .. ." Id.; Rome
Statute, supra note 2, arts. 11, 24.
41. Robinson, supra note 19, at 49.
42. CAHWCA, supra note 20, §§ 4(3), 6(3); Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8.
43. Id. § 4(3).
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ROME STATUTE ARTICLE 6
For the purpose of this Statute, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group, such as:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; and
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group."4
Due to Canada's decision to mandate the prosecution of crimes
retrospectively, simple reference to the Rome Statute would not suffice. A
temporal element had to be included in the definition of the crimes to
incorporate the law and make it applicable to the time of the commission of the
crime.45 Also, the CAHWCA references the Rome Statute's inability to
encumber the development of customary international law.' This added
element synchronizes the Canadian approach with its treaty obligations,
intending to give its courts jurisdiction retrospectively while not stopping the
development of customary international law.
Canada did have a substantial constitutional hurdle to negotiate in its
legislative process to incorporate Article 28, "Command Responsibility," of the
Rome Statute.47 It is insightful to further examine the mechanism Canada
utilized to mold the intention of Article 28 with its constitutional jurisprudence
and the drafting of the CAHWCA due to the possibility that the United States
could encounter a similar dilemma in the incorporation of Article 28, or other
Articles of the Rome Statute, though most likely not in a constitutional context.
The crime of "Command Responsibility" as delineated in the Rome Statute
contains a disjunctive mens rea test, allowing for either an objective or
subjective test for mental culpability (emphasis added).48  The Canadian
44. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.
45. CAHWCA, supra note 20, §§ 4, 6.
46. Id. § 4(4) (For greater certainty, crimes described in Articles 6 and 7 and paragraph 2 of Article
8 of the Rome Statute are, as of July 17, 1998, crimes according to customary international law. This does
not limit or prejudice in any way the application of existing or developing rules of international law).
47. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28.
48. Id. ("That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
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constitutional practice (Charter of Rights and Freedoms)49 requires strict
subjectivity for a crime that would reflect the "high degree of moral stigma
society subscribes to those convicted of such crimes."5 Therefore, the test of
"either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known" as
contained in the Rome Statute Article 28(a)(i) had to be amended.5
In Regina v. Vaillancourt, the Canadian Supreme Court outlawed vicarious
criminal liability for such serious crimes as murder, when the mens rea
requirement is merely subjective.52 In response to this quandary, the Canadian
Parliament fashioned a new crime, "Breach of Responsibility by a Superior,"
which pertains to both military and civilian commanders, as required by the
Rome Statute, Article 28(a) and (b).53 A person found guilty of the Canadian
crime of "Breach of Responsibility by a Superior" can possibly receive the same
sentence as someone who has been found guilty for direct commission of an
Article 5 crime.54 This assures the required Article 28 result.5 s
Canada was able to secure the inclusion of Article 28 of the Rome Statute
by utilizing its Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence as a guide, and
securing the adherence to the Canadian Constitution (Charter of Rights and
Freedoms) but not diverge too greatly from the purpose and meaning of Article
28 of the Rome Statute.
Under the CAHWCA, a military commander or superior would be guilty
of an Article 5 crime if a military commander either "failed to exercise proper
control over a subordinate" and, as a result, an Article 5 offence was com-
mitted56 or "knew, or was criminally negligent in failing to know" that a
subordinate is "about to or is committing" an Article 5 offence,57 including
consciously disregarding evidence that clearly indicated that an Article 5
offence was being committed or was about to commit such an offence and
"failed to take, as soon as practicable, all necessary and reasonable measures to
should have known .. "); Progress Report by Canada, supra note 19, at 3.
49. Canadian Charter, supra note 27.
50. Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 701.
51. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(a)(i).
52. Regina v. Vaillancourt [1987] S.C.R. 636 (Eng.); Robinson, supra note 19, at 52.
53. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28 (including explicitly both a military, under Article 28(a), and
a civilian under Article 28(b), component regarding Command Responsibility); see also CAHWCA, supra
note 20, § 5.
54. CAHWCA, supra note 20, § 5(3) ("Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1),
(2) or (2.1) is liable to imprisonment for life").
55. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 77-1(b) ("A term of life imprisonment when justified by the
extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person ... !).
56. CAHWCA, supra note 20, §§ 5(l)(a)(i), 7 (for offences occurring outside of Canada).
57. Id. §§ 5(l)(b), 7 (for offences occurring outside of Canada).
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prevent or repress the commission of the offence or of further offences," or
submit the matter to competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
5 8
Military commanders and others would be liable also for having attempted to,
committed, conspired, counseled, or been an accessory to any Article 5 crimes
outside of Canada."9
The CAHWCA was able to solve the constitutional dilemma by
circumventing the disjunctive mens rea test in Article 28 of the Rome Statute
and creating a new law which gave equal effect of Article 28 but fit within the
established constitutional confines delineated in Regina v. Vaillancourt and
Regina v. Finta. Also, the punishment for the crime of breach of "Command
Responsibility" can be life imprisonment, identical to that of the Article 28 of
the Rome Statute, adding credence to Canada's adherence to the Rome Statute
in general.
The ICC has complementary jurisdiction with the Canadian legal system.'
The ICC can obtain jurisdiction only if Canada were to have jurisdiction over
the offence (or suspect) and were unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute
an alleged crime or suspect.6 The Canadian jurisdiction is, however, subject to
both a presence requirement and a consent requirement. 62  There cannot be a
trial in absentia; however, an investigation can occur without the detention of
a suspect of the alleged crime.63 The Attomey General's written consent is
required before a prosecution can proceed.'M Also, the CAHWCA prescribes a
58. Id.
59. ld. § 6(l.1).
60. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. I ("[the International Criminal Court] shall be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions").
61. Id. art. 18(3) ('The Prosecutor's deferral to a State's investigation shall be open to review by
the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral or at any time when there has been a significant change
of circumstances based on the State's unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation."
Article 17(l)(a), states that, "[tihe case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution .....
62. CAHWCA, supra note 20, §§ 9(2)-<4).
63. Id. § 9(2) ("For greater certainty, in a proceeding commenced in any territorial division under
subsection (1), the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to requirements that an accused appear at and be
present during proceedings and any exceptions to those requirements apply").
64. Id. §§ 9(3),(4) (Procedures and Defences section) (No proceedings for an offence under any of
sections 4 to 7 of this Act, or under section 354 or subsection 462.3 1(1) of the Criminal Code in relation to
property or proceeds obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of the commission of an offence
under this Act, may be commenced without the personal consent in writing of the Attorney General or Deputy
Attorney General of Canada, and those proceedings may be conducted only by the Attorney General of
Canada or counsel acting on their behalf. . .No proceedings for an offence under section 18 may be
commenced without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada).
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mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for the intentional commission of an
ICC crime and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment in any other case."
Finally, as prescribed in the Rome Statute, there are no immunities' and
no applicable statutes of limitation67 for the Rome Statute Article 5 crimes" in
the CAHWCA. Canada can, as the United States continues to do, enter into
bilateral "Article 98 Agreements," even though the enforceability and requisite
verbiage is still open for judicial interpretation.69
In sum, Canada had, prior to the Rome Statute, domestically legislated
crimes against humanity and war crimes into their criminal code.7" The
subsequent difficulty Canada had with effectively prosecuting individuals under
the new laws allowed for Canada to take advantage of the Rome Statute to build
upon the experience and revamp their criminal code. Furthermore, Canada
decided to broaden its jurisdiction qf ICC crimes through the use of
retrospection and, as a result of that decision, incorporating the ICC crimes by
reference to the Rome Statute was not possible. A temporal element had to be
included which reflected the decision to utilize retrospectivity. The crime of
using chemical weapons was incorporated in the CAHWCA. This crime was
absent from the final version of the Rome Statute and is evidence of the highly
politicized and heavily negotiated nature of the Rome Statute.
As some of the Rome Statute is reflective of more recent developments of
customary international law, Canada prudently decided to forgo the use of
retroactivity, allowing for past acts to be judged by the customary law that
governed at the time of the commission of the crime. Lastly, Canada negotiated
through the Rome Statute's requirements of "Command Responsibility" using
its constitutional jurisprudence as the guide. The Canadian Supreme Court had
found vicarious criminal liability for serious crimes, like murder,
unconstitutional and required subjective mens rea requirements for adjudication.
65. Id. §§ 4(2)(a), 4(2)(b), 5(3), 6(a), 6(b), 7(4), 15(l)(aHd), 15(1.1), 15(2), 15(3), 15(5).
66. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27; CAHWCA, supra note 20, § 3.
67. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 29; see generally CAHWCA, supra note 20.
68. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5.
69. COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, US BILATERAL IMMUNITY OR SO-
CALLED "ARTICLE 98" AGREEMENTS (2003), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2003/0606usbilaterals.htm (Among other rationale, some legal
scholars and those involved in the Rome Conference negotiations have declared that the United States Article
98 agreements are contrary to the language of Article 98 itself. The proposed agreements attempt to amend
the terms of the Rome Statute by ostensibly canceling out the concept of 'sending state' from Article 98(2).
'Sending state' indicates that the language of Article 98(2) is intended to cover only SOFAs, SOMAs and
other similar agreements. SOFAs and SOMAs reflect a division of responsibility for a limited class of persons
deliberately sent from one country to another and carefully addresses how any crimes they may commit should
be addressed) [hereinafter Article 98 Agreements].
70. See Canadian Criminal Code, supra note 32.
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Therefore, Canada fashioned a new crime with subjective criteria to assure that
the stigma that a conviction for such a heinous crime would carry has sufficient
due process.
B. Australia
On January 9, 2002, Australia's legislation which domestically imple-
mented the Rome Statute came into effect without requiring amendments to the
Australian constitution." The International Criminal Court Act of 2002 ("ICC
Act") and the International Criminal Court ("Consequential Amendments") Act
of 2002 ("ICCCA") were passed by parliament on June 27, 2002.72 Australia
then ratified the Rome Statute on July 1, 2002, becoming the seventy-fifth state
to ratify. 7" The ICC Act is mainly focused on the procedural elements, such as
cooperation, arrest, and extradition between Australia and the ICC, and is
therefore less important for the purposes of this discussion.74
The more pertinent act is the ICCCA which not only codified the elements
of each crime in painstaking detail and the corresponding maximum sentences,
but also, inter alia, made the necessary modifications to the Australian Criminal
Code.75 The ICCCA contains all the major crimes in Articles 5 through 8 of the
Rome Statute except Article 8(2)(b)(xx).76 The subsection makes reference to
71. See Rome Statue, supra note 2; See International Criminal Court Act, 2002, No. 41 (Austl.)
[hereinafter Australia ICC Act]; Hon. Darryl Williams, Commonwealth Attorney General, Speech to
International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law regarding the International Criminal Court: The
Australian Experience (Aug. 3 0, 2 0 0 1 ),
http://www.ag.gove.au/agd/WWW/attomerygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Speeches-2001_SpeechesTheIntern
ational _CriminalCourt:_TheAustralianExperience (in a speech by the former Australian Attorney-
General, Darryl Williams (1996-2003), he stated "The constitutionality of the proposed legislation giving
effect to the ICC is one of the issues raised by some critics of Australian ratification. The Government has
satisfied itself that ratification of the Statute and enactment of the necessary legislation will not be inconsistent
with any provision of the Constitution").
72. See Australia ICC Act, supra note 71; International Criminal Court (Consequential
Amendments) Act, 2002, No. 42, at 2 (Austi.) [hereinafter Australia ICCCA Act] (an act to amend the
Criminal Code Act 1995 and certain other acts in consequence of the enactment of the International Criminal
Court Act 2002, and for other purposes).
73. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; See COALrrION FOR THE ICC, AUSTRAUA (2005)
http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/oceania/australia.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
74. See Australia ICC Act, supra note 71.
75. See Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72.
76. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xx) ("Employing weapons, projectiles and materials
and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which
are inherently indiscriminate in violation of international law of armed conflict, provided that such weapons,
projectiles and materials and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are
included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in
Articles 121 and 123 .. .
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an annex to the Rome Statute which was not included in the final version of the
Rome Statute and was supposed to delineate certain "weapons, projectiles and
materials, and methods of warfare" in accordance with Article 8(2)(b)(xx)."
The first substantive provision of the ICCCA, subdivision B, begins with the
crime of genocide, Article 6 of the Rome Statute.7' This marks the first time
that the crime of genocide is established in Australian law, although there had
been previous legislative attempts to do so by the Australian Parliament.79
There are five offences of the crime of genocide as it appears in the Rome
Statute, and the ICCCA mirrors both the elements and the offences."0
However, the ICCCA does not require that the genocidal conduct take
place in a "manifest pattern of similar conduct," as is required in the Elements
of Crimes. l Intent alone suffices for prosecution." The lack of this element
should ease the burden of the prosecution to convict an alleged perpetrator.
Also, it solidifies the fact that complementarity jurisdiction can not only be
invoked by Australia, making conviction easier for Australian courts than for
the ICC, but that any prosecution would be upheld by the ICC in accordance
with Article 19(2)(b) of the Rome Statute.
Subdivision C of the ICCCA creates the criminal offence of crimes against
humanity and follows Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 3 The detailed subsections,
beginning with 268.8, flesh out the elements of each crime. 4 The only devia-
tion from the Rome Statute appears with the unique approach that Australia took
regarding the crime against humanity of the "forced disappearances of persons"
by dividing it into two parts thus broadening the reach of the crime beyond that
of the Rome Statute.85 The two sections differ with regards to the person who
refuses to acknowledge the criminal act of "forced disappearance." 6 Section
268.21(l)(e) places the judicial focus on the government or organization
responsible for the forced disappearance, while section 268.21 (2)(h) focuses on
77. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
78. Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72, §§ B; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.
79. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Australia's Legislation for the Implementation of the Rome Statute,
in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 70, 71 (Matthias Neuner ed., 2003).
80. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6; See Australia ICCCA, supra note 72.
81. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES,
ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002) [hereinafter ELEMENTS OF CRIMES].
82. Id.
83. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(a)-(k); see also Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72, §§
C 268.8-268.23 (Rome Statute art. 7(1)(a)-(k) corresponds to §§ C 268.8-268.23 of the Australia ICCCA
Act).
84. Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72, §§ C 268.8-268.23.
85. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7-1(i); Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72, §§ C 268.21;
McCormack, supra note 79, at 71.
86. Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72, §§ 268.21(1),(2).
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the 'perpetrator' of the forced disappearance who refuses to acknowledge the
forced disappearance." By bifurcating Article 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute, it
assures that the crime will not go unpunished by simply denying either actual
complicity in the criminal act or the official condoning of such acts by a
representative group."8 This complies with the general tenor of ending impunity
in the Rome Statute.
Australian history, similar to that of the United States, evidences episodes
of unjust dealings with the indigenous population of that continent. 9 This may
explain in part the motivation of the Australian Parliament to not make the
crime of genocide retrospective in its application, as Canada decided to do, but
rather apply the new law going forward as of July 1, 2002. Article 6(e) of the
Rome Statute criminalizes the forced transferring of children of one group to
that of another group. 9° The Australian government has in the past taken
children of aboriginal Australians and placed them elsewhere in an attempt to
acculturate the indigenous Australians. 9'
Australia had attempted to employ the tool of universal jurisdiction as it
pertained to criminal prosecutions of non-Australian citizens for crimes
perpetrated against non-Australian citizens, specifically Nazi war criminals who
had taken residence in Australia after the Second World War.92 Australia went
so far as to grant universal jurisdiction over the crimes in the Rome Statute to
the Australian courts.93 Again, this may have been done to assure primacy over
any case in which the ICC may have an interest. The Australian Attorney
General is required to give his written consent before a prosecution can proceed,
however, investigation in absentia may occur.94
In sum, Australia first codified the crime of genocide in the ICCCA by
duplicating the offences in the Rome Statute, but the ICCCA does not require
that the genocidal conduct take place in a "manifest pattern of similar conduct,"
as is required in the Elements of Crimes.95 The crime of forced disappearances
87. Id.
88. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(i).
89. See generally Michael Legg, Indigenous Australians and International Law: Racial
Discrimination, Genocide and Reparations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 387 (2002) (discussing history of
indigenous Australians).
90. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6(e).
91. See Legg, supra note 89, at 389.
92. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 n.91 (1991).
93. See generally Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72.
94. Id. pt. 3 (allows for a suspect to be arrested, charged, remanded to custody or released on bail
before the AG's consent is obtained).
95. ELEMENTS OF CRuMES, supra note 81.
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was divided into two crimes, with each focusing on the mens rea of distinct
suspects, either governmental perpetrators or individual (non-governmental)
perpetrators.96 Finally, universal jurisdiction was granted for all crimes in the
Rome Statute, however, there is no retrospectivity jurisdiction for the crime of
genocide. It would appear that the deviations from the Rome Statute were to
assure the Australian courts jurisdiction over crimes in which the ICC could
have an interest and to possibly ease prosecutors' burdens for prosecution.
C. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom government had proclaimed its intention to be one
of the first sixty states to ratify the Rome Statute.97 Making good on this pledge,
the United Kingdom signed the Rome Statute on November 30, 1998, then
subsequently ratified it on October 4, 2001, becoming the forty-second state to
do so.9' As with dualist nations, until necessary domestic legislation is passed,
a foreign treaty cannot be ratified. Further, the United Kingdom legal system
does not allow self-executing treaties. Therefore, the United Kingdom ratifica-
tion process does not allow for any international treaty obligations of the
sovereign to be ratified until domestic legislation codifying the treaty obliga-
tions is passed through the parliamentary process.99
The United Kingdom had an arguably more simplified legislative route to
maneuver in order to ratify the Rome Statute due to its lack of any formal
constitution. There were no insurmountable hurdles which would require
modifying the fundamental source of domestic law. This does not mean,
however, that the United Kingdom legal system is amenable to any and all
proposed legislation. The United Kingdom common law has defined the
boundaries of its society for centuries.
The United Kingdom passed the International Criminal Court Act ("ICC
Act") in 2001,"° which applies predominantly to England, Wales, and Northern
Ireland, 0! paving the way for ratification. Scotland adopted its own ICC Act
the same year1 °2 due to the fact that the Scottish Parliament has autonomy over
the drafting and inclusion of criminal statutes for its territory. The
96. Id.
97. EUR. CONSULT. ASS., Progress Report by the United Kingdom, Doc. No. 31 (2001) [hereinafter
Progress Report by U.K.].
98. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; see SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14.
99. Schense & Piragoff, supra note 2, at 248.
100. See International Criminal Court Act, 2001, c. 17 (U.K.) [hereinafter U.K. ICC Act]; John A.
Gilbert, The United Kingdom's Approach to Implementation of the Rome Statute, in NATIONAL LEGISLATION
INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 55 (Matthias Neuner ed., 2003).
101. See Progress Report by the U.K., supra note 97.
102. International Criminal Court (Scot.) Bill, 2001, (S.P. Bill 27A).
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parliamentary process comprises debates in both houses, the Commons and the
Lords, approval by both houses, and royal consent.
The United Kingdom took a pragmatic approach to ratifying the Rome
Statute. According to John A. Gilbert, a Grade 7 in the Home Office's Criminal
Policy Group, the United Kingdom's "aim has been to assure that the offences
under the Rome Statute can be effectively and successfully prosecuted in our
domestic courts."' 3
The United Kingdom incorporated the ICC crimes, in large part, by simple
reference to the Rome Statute Articles 6 through 8 crimes, 4 and included the
possibility of the crime of aggression in Article 9.'05 The ICC Act does not
define any of the crimes in detail, but refers judges to the ICC Elements of
Crimes.'0 6 Many of the crimes, however, had already been codified by the
United Kingdom Parliament, and the concern was whether the incorporation of
those crimes, pursuant to the wording of the Rome Statute, would suffice for
ratification purposes.'0 7 The United Kingdom was apparently cognizant while
drafting the law for fear of not implementing the Rome Statute in its entirety
and thus included the mention of Article 9 in its implementing legislation.
The United Kingdom broadened its extradition law through the ICC Act
2001 by empowering its judicial system to extradite a suspect who has been
accused of the crime of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, to a
third-party state who has universal jurisdiction over the alleged crime even
though the United Kingdom may not have jurisdiction.'0 8 The United Kingdom
did this by adding to section 51(2)(b). This eliminated the criterion of dual
criminality, which attaches a criminal specter to any person who is either a
United Kingdom citizen, resident, or is somehow subject to United Kingdom
103. Gilbert, supra note 100, at 57.
104. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, §§ 50, 51.
105. (1) In this Part- "genocide" means an act of genocide as defined in Article 6, "crime against
humanity" means a crime against humanity as defined in Article 7, and "war crime" means a war crime as
defined in Article 8.2.
(2)(a) any relevant Elements of Crimes adopted in accordance with Article 9....
U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, § 50 (the crime of aggression is referred to in subpart (2)(a)).
106. (2) In interpreting and applying the provisions of those Articles the court shall take into
account-
(a) any relevant Elements of Crimes adopted with Article 9, and
(b) until such time as Elements of Crimes are adopted under that Article, any relevant
Elements of Crimes contained in the report of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC
adopted on 30th June 2000.
UK ICC Act, supra note 100, § 50(2).
107. See Progress Report by the U.K., supra note 97.
108. See U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, §§ 71-73 (these sections deal with extradition); GLBERT,
supra note 100, at 61.
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service of process jurisdiction,"°9 and has allegedly committed any of the ICC
crimes outside the United Kingdom, but is considered a crime.
Also, sections 52 and 59 of the ICC Act give United Kingdom courts the
ability to extradite indicted suspects for crimes ancillary to genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity."0 Ancillary crimes are defined in sections
55 and 62 of the ICC Act as:
1) Aiding and abetting;
2) Counseling or procuring the commission of an offence;
3) Inciting a person to commit an offence;
4) Attempt or conspiring to commit an offence;
5) Assisting an offender; and
6) Concealing an offence."'
Section 72 of the ICC Act, which closes the door on harboring
international criminals for good, is an innovative approach to assure rule of law
worldwide." 2 The ICC Act also removes the dual-criminality extradition rule
so that states which have a broader criminal jurisdiction can extradite a suspect
from the United Kingdom." 3
The consent of the Attorney General is required before any prosecution can
commence." 4 Interestingly, the United Kingdom did not incorporate the general
principles of law, like defenses, because there is very little divergence between
the United Kingdom criminal provisions and those in the Rome Statute which
correspond.' ' However, Article 28 of the Rome Statute, "Command
Responsibility," is replicated."'
D. Germany
For historical reasons, Germany had a moral obligation to not take a
passive role in implementing the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute and the ICC
are the direct progeny of the Nuremberg Tribunal which was convened as a
result of the Nazi war of aggression and the perpetration of atrocities during the
109. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, § 51(2)(b).
110. Id. §§ 52, 59.
111. Id. §§ 55, 62.
112. Id.§ 72.
113. See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others EX Parte
Pinochet Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others EX
Parte Pinochet, [1999] A.C. (appeal taken from Q.B.) (discussing the dual criminality rule).
114. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, §§ 53(3), 60(3).
115. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, pt. 3, 4 (numerating the rights of the accused suspect during the
investigative stage); GILBERT, supra note 100, at 59.
116. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, § 65; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28.
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Second World War." 7 Germany should be commended for its ICC imple-
menting legislation, as it generally broadens the scope of German jurisdiction
for both its courts, and with regard to specific criminal acts. It has, since the
Berlin Conference, manifestly supported the implementation of the Rome
Statute, evidenced by the subsequent amendment to its constitution allowing for
the extradition of its nationals to other competent judicialfora." 8 Germany also
declared that the ICC may promote the beginning of a harmonization process
of international criminal law amongst states." 9  With its implementing
legislation, Germany not only recognizes its international treaty obligations by
incorporating language from the Geneva Convention and the Optional Protocols
into the code, but has made a concerted effort to legislate a modem and
functional legal framework to assure that the types of crimes that had been
committed by past German governments never occur again or at least do not go
unpunished. 12
0
Germany ratified the Rome Statute on December 11, 2000, becoming the
twenty-fifth ratifying state.' 2 ' The legislature in Berlin passed the new German
Code of Crimes Against International Law ("CCAIL"), called in German,
V6lkerstrafgesetzbuch, which entered into force on June 30, 2002.122 Prior to
the enactment of the CCAIL, Germany had not codified such crimes as crimes
against humanity and war crimes as such. However, Germany had previously
codified the crime of genocide in 1955 when Germany ratified the Genocide
Convention.'23 The only change made in the 1955 Genocide Convention was
to update the antiquated terminology so as to bring the CCAIL into line with the
Rome Statute, more common usage of terms, and move the crime into the part
of the criminal code dealing with crimes against international law. 1
24
German lawmakers decided to utilize the CCAIL drafting exercise to
codify only those crimes and principles of international criminal law that were
117. DINAH L. SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ix-xi (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
118. Schense & Piragoff, supra note 2, at 249; GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] (F.R.G.).
119. Schense & Piragoff, supra note 2, at 254.
120. Id.
121. Rome Statute, supra note 2; see SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14.
122. See Act to Introduce the Code of Crimes against International Law, 2002, (Germany)
[hereinafter German CCAIL Act]; see COALITION FOR THE ICC, GERMANY (2005)
http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/europecis/germany.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
123. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (Germany's accession occurred on Nov. 24, 1954) 119 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
124. Id.; see also Andreas Zimmermann, Main Features of the new German Code of Crimes against
InternationalLaw, in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 140 (Matthias Neuner
ed., 2003) (updating such terminology in the crime of genocide by switching durch ihr Volkstum besimmt, a
group determined by their nationality, with ethnische Gruppe, an ethnic group).
novel to the German Code, not completely revamp the criminal code."2 5 Some
of the deviations from the Rome Statute which were incorporated into the
CCAIL broaden the scope of German jurisdiction. For example, section 6(1)
of the CCAIL mandates that the killing of a single member of a protected group
can constitute genocide if the perpetrator acted with the requisite mens rea.126
The Rome Statute, on the other hand, in Article 6(a), clearly states that there
must be multiple killings for it to be considered genocide, as it says, "[K]illing
members of the group . ,,"t27 By lowering the actus reus threshold for
genocide and correctly focusing on the mens rea of the perpetrator, additional
indignity, violence, and inhumanity is not required to be visited upon more than
one person before an ICC crime is committed.
Germany availed itself of universal jurisdiction prior to the incorporation
of the CCAIL.128 However, with the inclusion of the CCAIL into German law,
the principle of universal jurisdiction would apply to all criminal offences
against international law included in the CCAL even if there is no linkage
between Germany and the crime.129  This specification, as Germany had
proposed at the ICC Preparatory Committee negotiations in 1998,130 is
commendable and truly an example of universal jurisdiction. The prosecutors
are given wide discretion whether to investigate an ICC crime due to the fear
that German courts would be continuously congested with extraterritorial claims
in search of a credible judicial forum. 3' Germany supercedes not only its
fellow ICC brethren-states, but the Rome Statute itselP32 with regard to the
reach of German jurisdiction as it pertains to the ICC crimes.
125. See German CCAIL Act, supra note 122; Matthais Neuner, General Principles oflinternational
Criminal Law in Germany, in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 105
(Matthias Neuner ed., 2003).
126. German CCAIL Act, supra note 122, § 6(1).
127. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6(a) (emphasis added).
128. The four Geneva Conventions include: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (Germany had already availed itself of universal jurisdiction for the crime of genocide and for
the crime of murder against "protected persons" as defined in the Geneva Convention.) [hereinafter Geneva
Conventions].
129. German CCAIL Act, supra note 122, § 1.
130. See generally Johan D. Van der Vyver, Personal Territorial Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L REv. 1 (2000).
131. Neuner, supra note 125, at 107.
132. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 2 (There is no specific requirement of universal
jurisdiction for signatory or domestic ratification purposes).
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Many of the German deviations from the Rome Statute are due to
considerations focusing specifically on the preference of using language that
had been previously utilized in the German criminal law and therefore can
successfully prosecute those suspected of committing ICC crimes. 133 This may
be accomplished because it requires less judicial interpretation and may reflect
administrative ease for prosecutors and defense counsel. As new terminology
is incorporated, judicial interpretation is, at times, required to parse out the
meaning as it is applied to a specific circumstance. With no ICC interpretations
currently available and no jurisprudence to build upon, the German courts
would rely on German usage as well as international judicial usage. The
uncertainty of definitional meanings may cause some to question the judicial
findings and ultimately the due process rights granted suspects. Therefore,
balancing the use of well-established terminology in domestic jurisprudence and
the inclusion of novel legal principles is crucial in the domestic debate regarding
domestic legislation incorporating the Rome Statute.
Other language diverges from the Rome Statute as a result of German law
makers questioning the developmental stage of certain customary legal
principles. 34 As the Rome Statute evidences intense negotiation, it may not
reflect the current state of customary international law. Germany apparently
decided to forgo any negotiated regression and to bring its criminal code up to
date with customary international law, understanding presumptively, that
codifying the current state of customary law, it would not prejudice or hinder
the continuing development of customary international law for domestic
prosecution purposes. 135
Finally, deviations from the Rome Statute apparently were calculated to
encompass those international legal obligations, embodied in the Genocide
Convention and Geneva Convention and Optional Protocols, which were not
incorporated into the Rome Statute. 136 One can assume that in some parts of the
CCAIL, treaty language was chosen over the Rome Statute language because
Germany wanted to broaden, not narrow, the scope of the CCAIL.'37 This does
not only assure Germany's capability to benefit from complementarity over any
ICC case, but it stands as an indicator to the international community of
133. Neuner, supra note 125, at 136.
134. Zimmerman, supra note 124, at 139 (discussing that the German CCAIL brings Germany's
criminal code up to date with customary international law).
135. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 10.
136. Rome Statute, supra note 2; Zimmerman, supra note 124, at 138; See also Geneva Conventions,
supra note 128; Genocide Convention, supra note 123.
137. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 2 (The Rome Statute was heavily negotiated and
therefore certain provisions may reflect more of a political compromise than the current status of customary
international law.).
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Germany's commitment to the rule of law and ending impunity for those who
choose to ignore it.
E. France
French ratification of the Rome Statute experienced a major obstacle which
could have derailed French involvement in the ICC, and had it not been for the
stalwart desire and will of the French to link themselves to the concept of the
ICC, this hurdle may have proven insurmountable. Although most treaty
obligations in civil law states become part of the national law when ratified,
France holds its constitution above any international legal obligation and
requires a constitutional amendment for any conflicting treaty obligation.'38
France, which is a civil law state, may submit any possibly conflicting treaty
obligation to the constitutional court for interpretation.'39
France signed the Rome Statute on July 18, 1998, and due to the constitu-
tional dilemmas which subsequently arose, almost two years transpired before
France was able to ratify the statute, which ultimately occurred on June 9,
2000.40 Subsequent to the official expression of the French government of its
intention to ratify the Rome Statute and its initial signature in 1998 at the Rome
Conference, both the French President and the Prime Minister requested on
December 24, 1998, that the French Constitutional Court issue a ruling on the
constitutionality of the Rome Statute.'
4
'
The constitutional court held that not only was Article 27142 of the Rome
Statute in direct contradiction to the protections provided for by Articles 26,141
138. Schense & Piragoff, supra note 2, at 238.
139. Id. at 248.
140. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; SIGNATURES &RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14 (showing when
France ratified the Rome Statute).
141. CC decision no. 98-408DC, Jan. 22, 1999, J.O., available at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/langues/anglais/a98408dc.pdf (the Constitutional Court's Decision regarding the
incompatibility of Article 27 of the Rome Statute and the French Constitution) [hereinafter Const. Council].
142. Irrelevance of official capacity:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute,
nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of
a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27.
143. La Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958 CONST. art. 26 (Fr.) (No Member of Parliament shall be
prosecuted, investigated, arrested, detained or tried in respect of opinions expressed or votes cast in the
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68,' " and 68-1 of the French Constitution for officials and heads of state in the
official capacity,"' but that Articles 17 and 20 together,'46 and Article 99(4)147
of the Rome Statute had to be addressed by the French legislature due to
conflicts between French constitutional principles and the authority of the ICC
as granted by the Rome Statute.
The French Constitutional Court found that the constitution, which strictly
forbade any judicial organ other than the French High Court of Justice to indict
the President of the Republic, had to be amended prior to ratification. 4 The
President of the Republic enjoyed an absolute immunity which the Rome
Statute would not recognize. 49 The constitutional spotlight also fell upon the
members of the French Parliament. 5 ° The constitutional court, focusing on the
immunities enjoyed by French Parliamentarians with respect to the opinions
they espouse and the votes which they cast, held that Article 27 of the Rome
exercise of his duties. No Member of Parliament shall be arrested for a serious crime or other major offence,
nor shall he be subjected to any other custodial or semi-custodial measure, without the authorization of the
Bureau of the assembly of which he is a member. Such authorization shall not be required in the case of a
serious crime or other major offence committedflagrante delicto or a final sentence. The detention, subjection
to custodial or semi-custodial measures, or prosecution of a Member of Parliament shall be suspended for the
duration of the session if the assembly of which he is a member so requires. The assembly concerned shall
convene as of right for additional sittings in order to permit the preceding paragraph to be applied should
circumstances so require.) [hereinafter France Const.].
144. France Const., supra note 143, art. 68 ("The President of the Republic shall not be held liable
for acts performed in the exercise of his duties except in the case of high treason. He may be indicted only
by the two assemblies ruling by identical vote in open ballots and by an absolute majority of their members.
He shall be tried by the High Court of Justice.").
145. France Const., supra note 143, art. 68(1) (Members of the Government shall be criminally liable
for acts performed in the exercise of their duties and classified as serious crimes or other major offences at
the time they were committed. They shall be tried by the Court of Justice of the Republic. The Court of Justice
of the Republic shall be bound by such definition of serious crimes and other major offences and such
determination of penalties as are laid down by statute.).
146. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17, 20; Articles 17 and 20 taken together of the Rome Statute,
according to the French Constitutional Court, would allow the ICC to:
[Liegitimately take jurisdiction based on a single application of a law of pardon or of
domestic rules regarding prescriptions. In such cases, France apart from any
unwillingness or inability of the State, could be forced to arrest and hand over a person
to the Court for the sole reason that the acts are covered, according to French law, by
pardon or prescription.
Olivier Barrat, CSIL Beijing Symposium on the Comparative Study of the International Criminal Law and
the Rome Statute, Ratification and Adoption: The French Perspective 2 (2003).
147. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 99(4).
148. See Const. Council, supra note 141.
149. See id. 15.
150. Id.
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Statute violated this constitutional safeguard.' The court held that Article 26
of the French Constitution did not allow for members of parliament to be
arrested for a serious crime, "nor be subjected to any other custodial or semi-
custodial measure without the authorization of the bureau of the assembly of
which they are a member," and that, "such authorization is not required in the
case of a serious crime or other major offence committedflagrante delicto.' 52
Regarding the concept and function with which "complementarity" would
play in the administration of jurisdiction between the ICC and France, the
constitutional court held that restrictions to the principle of "complementarity"
were defined and based in the rule pacta sunt servanda, a concept which is
"clear and well-defined.' ' 53
The constitutional court also found that the powers of the ICC Prosecutor,
as prescribed by the Rome Statute, were usurping the fringes of national
sovereignty; specifically that the ICC Prosecutor is empowered to act on French
territory without oversight of the national authorities." 4 To some pundits, the
infringements on the French Constitution were quasi-ethereal, for example, the
attack on the constitutional principle of "the essential conditions of the exercise
of national sovereignty" due to the ICC Prosecutor's unconstrained powers."' 5
Ultimately, France chose a legislative path which circumvented the
constitutional obstacles it faced. By an overwhelming vote of 858 to six, France
amended its Constitution, inserting a new Article, Article 53-2, which states,
"[t]he Republic recognizes the jurisdiction of the ICC according to the
conditions articulated by the treaty signed on July 18, 1998."I6 The French
approach is apparently stated so as to thwart the necessity of creating an
exception to specific constitutional Articles.'57
Arguably, there remains a fundamental hurdle still to negotiate regarding
the approach which the French took to incorporate the obligations contained
within the Rome Statute. It seems that there has been no conclusive judicial
determination regarding whether the French amendment will ultimately create
constitutional inconsistencies, but one can reasonably assume that as the
151. See id. 15.
152. Id. 16.
153. See Const. Council, supra note 141; Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Issues Raised with Regard
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by National Constitutional Courts, Supreme Courts
and Councils of State, at 1 (Jan. 2003).
154. See Const. Council, supra note 141.
155. See France Const., supra note 143; Barral supra note 146, at 2.
156. France Const., supra note 143, art. 53(2); Helen Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility
and the International Criminal Court, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 9 (2001).
157. Venice Commission, Report on Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, CDL/2000/104 (Jan. 15, 2001).
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circumstances arise, the French courts will sort out the hierarchy and procedures
for meeting the obligations contained within the Rome Statute.
Appending the constitution by simply inserting language which "recog-
nizes the jurisdiction of the ICC according to the Rome Statute" may signify
that conditions contained within the Rome Statute have been elevated to those
with constitutional primacy. Accordingly, all obligations under the Rome
Statute would have the full weight of the constitution behind them. This may
create inherent contradictions and inconsistencies within the French constitu-
tional practice.
According to French law, the French Constitution reigns as supreme law
on French territory, but mandated inaction in accordance with constitutional
tenets may require action under the Rome Statute.'58 For example, since the
French constitution has higher standing than international treaties, those who
enjoy immunity as prescribed under the constitution and cannot be prosecuted
in French courts may have to be extradited to the ICC upon its exercise of
jurisdiction over the individual for alleged criminal acts.'59 Thus, what was an
absolute immunity guaranteed by the constitution is now merely an abdication
to the ICC of custody and, in effect, is no immunity at all. The constitutional
inconsistency is, however, in accordance with the obligation to strip immunity
of persons suspected of committing an ICC crime.
Although the approach the French utilized suffices to ratify the Rome
Statute, subsequent French and ICC jurisprudence will detail the adequacy of
the approach taken by the French government.
HI. THE UNITED STATES' PERSPECTIVE
A. Discussion of United States'Interests
The approaches that the five countries took in legislating their unique
versions of the Rome Statute are paradigmatic of a multilateral non-self-
executing treaty which does not allow for any reservations, and certain legal
obligations can supersede historically established constitutional tenets. Each
state had to create an amalgam of domestic criminal law, due process and
procedure, and merge it with an internationally negotiated treaty full of political
compromise and customary international law.
The United States can assume that many of the issues that arose during the
legislative implementation processes of the various states would translate in
some form or other into issues which might arise, were the United States to
attempt to implement the Rome Statute. Ancillary to this exercise is the
158. See France Const., supra note 143.
159. Barrat, supra note 146, at 4.
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knowledge of what issues have raised concern amongst the states about the
Rome Statute and their inclusion in the ICC regime. Gleaning this insight is
both beneficial and time-saving for Congress. The major issues, with which all
or most of the states had to grapple, were:
1) Whether to use previously legislated attempts of ICC crimes or to
utilize the language provided by the Rome Statute due to the
possibility of not fully implementing the Rome Statute;
2) How to reconcile a state's granting of immunity for the leading
political decision makers and Article 27 of the Rome Statute,
Irrelevance of Official Capacity;
3) Whether to implement retrospective jurisdiction to the ICC
crimes;
4) Whether to apply universal jurisdiction to the ICC crimes; and
5) The extent to which the domestic courts of each country would be
able to effectively and successfully prosecute those accused of ICC
crimes.
What all states had in common was a cognizance of not fully implementing
the Rome Statute resulting in their inability to take advantage of complemen-
tarity jurisdiction and thus exposing themselves unnecessarily to ICC jurisdic-
tion. Articles 17(1) and 18 of the Rome Statute are the jurisdictional linchpins
of the Rome Statute and, accordingly, they should also be the main focus for the
United States, regardless of whether the United States decides to ratify the
statute and become a signatory member state. 160
Article 18 is the general roadmap for admissibility and complementarity.161
Article 18 defines the steps that are required for both the prosecutor and the
state when a situation has been deemed reasonable to investigate.1 62 Article
17(1) lays out a test for which, if met, states can guarantee primacy on a case by
case basis within the ICC jurisdiction. 63 In effect, the two Articles make the
ICC a court of last resort. Only if a state is shown to be unwilling or unable to
genuinely investigate or prosecute a case can the ICC acquire primary
jurisdiction.
To assure primacy of United States jurisdiction over ICC crimes and
effectively eliminate the ICC's ability to prosecute persons from the United
States, the United States would have to create legislation to close the gaps in
160. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1), 18.
161. Id. art. 18.
162. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 18(1) (The meaning of "state" here is meant as the state that
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned, as it is used in Article 18(1) of the Rome
Statute.).
163. Id. art. 17(1).
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title 18 of the United States Code. This would presumably protect United States'
interests by securing its ability to prosecute all persons including United States'
nationals who have allegedly committed certain ICC crimes overseas where
United States federal jurisdiction is currently absent."6
In accordance with Article 18 procedures, were the prosecutor to decide to
continue with an investigation or prosecution after having deferred to the state,
the prosecutor would have to bring the issue before the pre-trial chambers of the
ICC to remove the case from the state's jurisdiction.'65 By closing the
jurisdictional gaps in the United States criminal code, and if the ICC Prosecutor
were motivated by anti-American propagandizing, as the United States has
argued is a possibility, it is reasonable to suppose that the pre-trial chamber
would be unsympathetic to the prosecutor's concerns were the United States to
have in place domestic legislation that left no room for doubt.
The purpose of the ICC is not to try individual and isolated crimes, as
discussed above, but as the preamble to the Rome Statute states, its focus is on
the adjudication of such grave criminal acts that threaten the peace, security, and
well-being of the world, and to end the impunity for the perpetrators of grave
crimes."6 As the United States continues with the "war on terror," the ICC is
poised to focus the global spotlight of truth and justice on the perpetrators of
human calamity.
Regardless of whether the ICC will prove to be the premier venue for the
prosecution of terrorists worldwide, the incorporation of the ICC crimes into
United States law would be an adept tool for the prosecution of terror suspects
in United States courts. The ability to reach globally, to all nationalities, to
extradite according to law, would serve as a moral victory for the United States
and the rule of law. The termination of global impunity for terrorists that escape
justice by hiding behind the protections of state-sponsors of terrorism is one of
the rationales put forward by the current United States Administration for the
invasion of Iraq.
The systematic attacks perpetrated against the United States on September
11, 2001, would have been within the ICC's jurisdiction, had the ICC existed
at the time. Difficulties in obtaining personal jurisdiction of suspected terrorists
have proven on occasion to be an insurmountable hurdle for the international
administration of justice, as evidenced by the Lockerbie suspects.' 67 Since it
164. CASSEL, supra note 1, at 436-38. (discussing the United States' difficulty in prosecuting
international perpetrators of genocide, such as Pol Pot and Saddam Hussein's Lieutenants in federal court due
to the lack of federal jurisdiction for the crimes they had allegedly committed).
165. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 18.
166. Id. pmbl.
167. See generally Omer Y. Elagab, The Hague as the Seat of the Lockerbie Trial: Some Constraints,
INTERNAT O NAL LAWYER (2000).
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appears as if the "war on terror" will continue for the foreseeable future,
empowering the United States to advantageously utilize the rule of law to bring
suspects to justice should be given serious consideration. It may even revitalize
the international perception of current United States foreign policy.
Although the United States during the Clinton Administration may have
touted the necessity and desire to establish a permanent international criminal
court,"' it would appear that the United States is the single largest impediment
to the legitimacy of the ICC.'69 Even though the United States actively
participated and even took a leading role in the negotiation of the Rome Statute,
the United States stands almost alone in its rejection of the ICC.'70 Since the
Rome Statute was finalized at the end of the 1998 conference, the United States
has attempted to redress issues which Ambassador David Scheffer, the United
States lead negotiator at Rome, called "fundamental flaws in the Rome
Treaty."'' The United States has also legislated policy to undermine the ICC.'72
Presently, there are no prospects that the United States will sign, re-sign, or
ratify the existing text in the future. 73 Reflective of the current administration's
policy on the ICC, Congressman Vito Fossella (R-NY, 13th District) warned
that the establishment of the ICC to prosecute war crimes could be used by
168. HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
EXPERIENCE 188 (1999); David Scheffer, The United States and the ICC, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 203 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000);
see also President's Remarks Honoring Genocide Survivors in Kigali, Rwanda, 34 WEEKLY COMp. PRES.
DoC. 13 (Mar. 30, 1998); see also STERLING JOHNSON, PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE: HEGEMONiC INSTABILITY
OR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw? 1 (2003).
169. Bassiouni, supra note 7 (stating that the greatest source of uncertainty for the ICC is the current
United States position); BALL, supra note 168, at 188.
170. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; see SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14 (There are
98 countries that have currently ratified the Rome Statute.); other countries that voted to reject the Rome
Statute were Israel, Iraq, Qatar, China, Libya, and Yemen. Human Rights Watch, The United States and the
International Criminal Court, http://www. hrw.org/campaigns/icc/us.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
171. See USUN Press Release, David J. Scheffer, Statement on "The International Criminal Court"
(Oct. 21, 1998), available at http://www.un.int/usa/98_179.htm.
172. See Article 98 Agreements, supra note 69 (legislation undermining the ICC); see 'American
Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2001, 107th Cong. § 857 (2001) [hereinafter ASPA]; U.S. Threatens to
Cut Aid to Countries That Support the ICC, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, Dec. 7, 2004,
http://www.humanightsfirSt.org/media/2004_alerts/ij_1207_icc.htm (threats to withhold financial payments
to countries who support the ICC).
173. David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
12, 121 (1999) ("Having considered the matter with great care, the United States will not sign the treaty in its
present form.").
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terrorist nations and enemies of the United States to thwart the war on
terrorism. 74
The importance of United States participation in the process is exemplified
by the leading role it had during the Preparatory Commission.'75 Subsequent
review conferences will remain the places where the United States can
participate and influence the future development of the court. By making the
political decision to not participate in the ICC, the United States voluntarily
relinquishes its ability to directly influence the court as it matures. The United
States, for example, will not be able to participate in the important decisions
regarding proposing judicial candidates, the ICC Prosecutor, or general court
staffing.
176
Also, the United States may not have a presence as an observer in the
Assembly of State Parties in 2009, when, supposedly, the signatory states are
to attempt a working definition of the crime of aggression. 77 However, as an
original signatory state, the United States has the right to attend. 171 Since the
Bush Administration took office in 2001, it has sent two delegations to the
Preparatory Commission Sessions. 179 Even though the Bush Administration's
delegations declared that the United States did not support the ICC and did not
participate in the plenary sessions, they did participate in the working groups on
financing of the ICC and the definition of the crime of aggression.' There is
simply too much at stake.
Specifically, the United States would not be able to voice its concern
regarding the definition of the crime in which the United States might fird itself
most exposed and little, if any, influence would have been exercised in its
formation. Although some, with greater insight, feel that the crime of
aggression will not be defined in the foreseeable future. 1'' The foregoing of any
significant influence over the eventual defmition of the crime of aggression may
prove to be ultimately rather unfortunate as it could either create an
unbridgeable chasm between the United States and the ICC or it quite possibly
could spell the eventual demise of the ICC.
174. Congressman Vito J. Fossella, Fossella Warns Int 7 Criminal Court Could Hinder America's
War on Terrorism, July 12, 2002, http://wwwhouse.gov/fossella/Press/pr020712.htm.
175. See Scheffer, supra note 10, at 98.
176. John Washburn, The International Criminal Court Arrives-The U.S. Position: Status and
Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 873, 880 (2002).
177. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 112 (describing the makeup and role of the Assembly of State
Parties within the International Criminal Court).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Bassiouni, supra note 7.
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Were the United States to reverse its current disengagement from the ICC,
there appears to be no internationally recognized requirement or procedure to
repudiate the Bolton letter of May 6, 2002, from the United Nations (U.N.).,, 2
According to the U.N. Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs, never before has a
state unsigned a U.N. treaty.183 Consequently, the procedures for withdrawal of
the document, if even necessary, are equally unexplored, specifically regarding
the legal significance of such a repudiation.
The Bolton letter was merely to notify the U.N. Secretary-General of the
United States intent to not become a party to the Rome Statute, a requirement
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties." Per Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, once a state has signed a treaty it is
barred from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. 5 The
United States passed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA)
two months later, in late July, 2002.116
Simply renouncing the Bolton letter by diplomatic communiqud to the
Secretary General, total disengagement by the United States would ostensibly
terminate. Communicating United States intent to the U.N. is important
because, without doing so, any United States legislation closing the gaps in title
182. Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, to General Kofi Annan,
U.N. Secretary-General (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/bolton.pdf (This letter was
the official communication from the United States government which informed the Secretary General of the
U.N. that the United States did not intend to become a party to the Rome Statute, and stated that the United
States has no legal obligations arising from President Clinton's signature on December 31, 2000.) [hereinafter
Bolton Letter].
183. Press Release, World Federalist Association, Bush Official Hints at "Unsigning" of Rome
Statute (Mar. 28, 2002) (quoting U.N. Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs).
184. This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to
become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations
arising from its signature on December 31, 2000. The United States requests that its
intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the
depositary's status lists relating to this treaty.
Bolton Letter, supra note 182.
185. Article 18. Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not
to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force
of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 18.
186. See ASPA, supra note 172; see Chronology of ICC-Related Legislation, WASHINGTON
WORKING GROUP ON THE ICC (May, 2001), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/aspa/presswiccaspa2002O8.doc.
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18 would not allow the United States to be "willing" to genuinely investigate
or prosecute, now that the United States was "able" to do so. Also, by
renouncing the Bolton letter, the ICC pre-trial chambers would be less
sympathetic to propio motu requests by the prosecutor to remove the case from
United States jurisdiction.
B. United States' Fears
The trepidation that the United States has expressed regarding the ICC was
best articulated by the United States contingent at Rome,'87 then rehashed by the
Bush Administration sometime subsequent. It appears to center around the fear
of the United States losing its sovereign decision-making power 8' over its
citizenry and national interests,'8 9 even when acting strictly within the U.N.
authorized confines of a peacekeeping mission."9 While the United States
currently maintains that it does not recognize any obligations under the Rome
Statute,' 9 ' remarkably, the United States is questionably more exposed as a non-
signatory state than a state who has signed the treaty."rc Additionally, questions
concerning sovereign integrity of non-party states to the Rome Statute arose
with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593 of March 31, 2005, granting the
ICC Prosecutor "Chapter VII" authority to begin an investigation of the alleged
atrocities perpetrated in Sudan.'9 3
These are powerful and valid arguments and are not to be easily discarded
by those who merely disagree with the United States foreign policy or its
negotiating strategy in Rome. The validity of these arguments must not only be
discussed by the international community. They must be met with a political
response that re-engages the United States into the ICC fold and the inter-
national community as a whole. Without dialogue and a resolution, the ICC
will marginally exist at its own peril. Even if the United States Administration
continues its current policy of actively working to isolate itself from the ICC,
the United States should nonetheless prepare its federal criminal code in an
attempt to minimize, if not fully eliminate, its exposure and create the requisite
political and legal environment to protect its national interests and assure United
187. BALL, supra note 168, at 191.
188. Scheffer, supra note 173, at 15; BALL, supra note 168, at 201.
189. BALL, supra note 168, at 191; Thomas Omestad, The Brieffor a World Court; a Permanent
War-Crimes Tribunal Is Coming, but Will it Have Teeth?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 6, 1997, at 52.
190. BALL, supra note 168, at 192.
191. Bolton Letter, supra note 182 (The United States has no legal obligations arising from President
Clinton's signature on December 31, 2000.).
192. William K. Lietzau, International Criminal Law after Rome: Concerns from a United States
Military Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 131 (2001).
193. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (March 31, 2005).
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States primacy over all potential ICC actions involving those United States
interests.
A possible scenario could develop as follows: the United States President
gives the approval to bomb what intelligence sources have indicated is a
building housing belligerents, when in fact it is later proven to have been a
hospital and innocent civilians are killed. An NGO, or the state where the
bombing took place, or a state of nationality of a victim (if they are members of
the ICC regime) informs the ICC Prosecutor of the incident. Before the ICC
Prosecutor can initiate an investigation, he must inform all relevant parties of
the incident. By calling on the states concerned, complementarity mandates that
the United States have the option to take control of the investigation in
accordance with Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute.
For the United States to comply with Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome
Statute'94 and assume primacy over the investigation and possible adjudication
of American citizens accused of an ICC crime, the United States would have to
be able to both investigate and prosecute the alleged crime. Currently, the
United States does not have the legal framework in place to strictly comply with
all the demands of Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute, as gaps exist in the
United States criminal code regarding certain ICC crimes. 195 The United States
would have to initiate a bonafide investigation within six months and prove to
the ICC Prosecutor that the investigation, if needed, was able to trace up the line
of command, possibly up to the Chief Executive level. 196 The Rome Statute
does not recognize immunity for heads of state from prosecution. 97 The fear
of an international judicial organ mandating an investigation and the mere
possibility of prosecuting the President of the United States for decisions made
in his official capacity is real. It may prove to be one of the political hurdles
that the United States is incapable of clearing.
The United States could argue that having to initiate an investigation of the
President at the behest of an international body is a loss of sovereignty. Were
the ICC Prosecutor not satisfied with the United States capability to prosecute
a suspect, the ICC Prosecutor could forward a request to the pre-trial chambers
of the ICC and ask for the judge's approval to handle both the investigation and
194. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 17, 18.
195. Id.; Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091,2441, 1111 (2000); CASSEL, supranote
1, at 436.
196. CASSEL, supra note 1, at 436.
197. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute,
nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27(1).
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possible subsequent prosecution of United States personnel involved in the
bombing of the hospital.
Failing in the Article 18 arguments, the prosecutor may then look to Article
17(1) for jurisdiction, which is a case by case jurisdictional test. Article 17(1)
of the Rome Statute states, "the court shall determine that a case is inadmissible
where the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution. .. If the United States does not have the
requisite criminal statutes to satisfy Article 17(1), then in fact the United States
is ipso facto "unable" to prosecute.'" Were the United States to have the
requisite laws on the books, then the only question would be whether the United
States is "unwilling" to investigate or prosecute. This is a fundamentally
different question since every state must face this test, regardless of the breadth
of their implementing legislation.
Another major reservation that the United States seems to have with the
ICC is the fear that United States civilian and military persons would be
prosecuted for Article 5 crimes by rogue and politically motivated states, the
ICC Prosecutor, or the ICC Judges due to the possibility of anti-American
propagandizing.2"u There is also very little in the Rome Statute that recognizes
the unique circumstances of the United States military such that the United
States has "reluctantly -had to conclude that the treaty, in its present form,
contains flaws that render it unacceptable."' ' The ICC only focuses on the
extremely heinous crimes, as they are defined in Articles 5 through 8, that are
crimes in which the United States government arguably does not engage.02 The
United States has been a world leader in establishing ad hoc tribunals and
bringing the need for adjudication of intemational criminals to the forefront in
war stricken parts of the world like Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Balkans, 23 and
most recently in Cambodia, where direct legislative attention is focused on
ending impunity for the surviving Khmer Rouge officials.2 4
198. Id. art. 17(1) (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAw 165 (2003).
201. Rome Statute, supra note 2; BALL, supra note 168, at 201 (quoting Ambassador David J.
Scheffer who said, "On the practical side, no other nation matches the extent of the United States overseas
military commitments through alliances and special missions such as current peacekeeping commit-
ments. ... ").
202. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8.
203. David J. Scheffer, P-I Focus: U S. Sabotages International Court at Its Own Peril, THE
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 1, 2004, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/158282_focus0l.html.
204. See Ker Munthit, Khmer Rouge Bosses Could Face Trials Soon, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.),
Oct. 6, 2004.
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Accompanying the United States Administration's disassociation from the
ICC, the United States Congress took a significant step to codify the political
disengagement, the purposes of which can be viewed as a precursor to continued
negotiations regarding United States involvement in the ICC regime. The
ASPA was signed into law in August, 2002, by President Bush in order "to
protect United States military personnel and other elected and appointed
officials of the United States Government against criminal prosecution by an
international criminal court to which the United States is not a party.""0 5 But for
the Dodd Amendment inserted into the bill which eventually became Public
Law 107-206, as a second degree amendment, the disassociation would have
been a complete rupture.2°
The United States has legislated attempts to not only insulate itself from
the reach of the ICC, but also to penalize those states who do ratify the Rome
Statute as evidenced in the recent international debate regarding the "Article 98
Agreements" which grants a waiver and allows states to disregard their
obligation to cooperate with the ICC regarding the surrender of persons wanted
by the ICC if it were to require the states to act inconsistently with their
obligations under international law and agreements.2"7
IV. COMPARISON
A. What the United States Can Learn From the Different Approaches
As discussed briefly above, the United States had legislated some of the
ICC crimes prior to the existence of the ICC.05 It would not be advisable, how-
ever, for the United States to consider those statutes as substitutes for the Rome
Statute Articles 5 through 8 for a few reasons. First and most significantly,
current federal jurisdiction regarding war crimes and genocide has significant
jurisdictional gaps which do not allow for their prosecution in certain cases.
Other democracies wrestled with the possibility of using preexisting
legislation as substitutes for the Rome Statute language, in part, due to the
familiarity that their courts and lawyers had with the former legislation.
Ultimately, the states came to the realization that to fully assure ratification of
the Rome Statute, their codes had to be updated. It was in their best interests to
do so.
205. See ASPA, supra note 172.
206. Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks
on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820 (2002).
207. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 98.
208. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091, 2441 (these sections are respectively the United States federal crimes of
genocide and war crimes).
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Germany, for example, wrestled with using new language and ultimately
decided to not only update the old terminology with language from the Rome
Statute, but to broaden the scope of the implementing legislation by including
language from its international treaty obligations, which were not included in
the Rome Statute, arising from the Geneva Convention and Optional Protocols.
While the German technique is first-rate, there was no technical reason to
include the Optional Protocols to the Geneva Convention. The legal obligations
arising from ratified international treaties are binding nonetheless.
The United States will have to address Article 27 of the Rome Statute,
"Irrelevance of Official Capacity," in the near future regardless of whether the
United States wishes to ratify the Rome Statute.209 The fact that tests in Articles
17 and 18 require a state to be able and willing to genuinely investigate may
require an investigation of governmental officials (emphasis added).21 ° This
apparently cannot be avoided for state parties to the Rome Statute. The United
States can rely on the state of customary international law were the United
States to remain a non-state party to the ICC, as the ICJ in Congo v Belgium
drew a road map for head of state immunity.21' All state parties to the Rome
Statute have acquiesced to the abrogation of immunity for ICC crimes. A
government official may retain his or her immunity for domestic criminal
proceedings, but the domestic immunity will be ignored for ICC purposes. The
French example is on point. The French added a phrase to their constitution
recognizing the jurisdiction of the ICC according to the Rome Statute. The
constitutional amendment continues to provide domestic immunity for French
politicians acting in their official capacity from domestic criminal prosecutions
but does not shield the same persons from the ICC's jurisdiction. However,
non-state parties to the Rome Statute must rely on customary international law.
With regard to non-state parties to the Rome Statute, under customary
international law, the ICJ held in Congo v Belgium that there are four exceptions
to an incumbent head of state's absolute immunity:
1) A head of state is not immune from process in his or her home
country;
2) The home country has the option to waive the head of state
immunity in foreign jurisdictions;
3) There is no immunity for acts committed either before or after
the period that the head of state is in office, and there is no
immunity for international crimes committed while in office
which are committed in his or her private capacity; and
209. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27.
210. Id. arts. 17, 18.
211. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium, Feb. 14, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 536, 551-52.
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4) No immunity exists when an international court has proper
jurisdiction."'
The Rome Statute emboldens the argument that incumbent head of state
immunity was eroding under customary international law.213 Falling squarely
into the fourth exception to head of state immunity, the ICC relies on the state
party's proper abrogation of head of state immunity under the Rome Statute for
jurisdiction. However, heads of states of both state parties and non-state parties
to the Rome Statute apparently must conform their actions committed in their
private capacity as there is no immunity under customary international law for
atrocity crimes. There is no defensible rationale for granting impunity for
incumbent heads of state from atrocity crimes because the heinous nature of
such crimes cannot fall within the justifiable requirements of the office.
Generally, it appears that actions not committed in a private capacity by a non-
state party's incumbent head of state retains immunity under customary
international law while a state party's incumbent head of state does not in
accordance with Article 27 of the Rome Statute.
The United States will have to examine at a later date whether to include
retrospective and universal jurisdictions to any legislation that Congress would
propose to close the gaps in title 18 of the United States Code. The purpose, as
stated above, would be to assure United States jurisdictional primacy and meet
the tests in Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute. The broader the scope of
any proposed legislation would be to provide more weight to the United States
argument of having initially met the jurisdictional tests (a good faith
investigation or prosecution would subsequently have to occur). If the United
States were to apply retrospection, an examination of past United States policies
may have to occur prior to any enactment of retrospective jurisdiction.
Australia, for example, decided not to utilize the tool of retrospection due to its
government's historical policies of dealing unjustly with the indigenous
populations.
True universal jurisdiction, on the other hand, may not serve the best
interests of the United States. Even though universal jurisdiction for a crime
does not mean that it can be prosecuted in any court in all circumstances,214 and
ICC jurisdiction is based on the consent of the state parties where the crime
occurred or the nationality of the accused,2"5 the United States should fashion
212. Id.; see also Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats orDefendants? Defining the Future ofHead-of-State
Immunity, 52 DUKE L. J. 651, 665 (2002).
213. Rome Statute, supra note 2; Tunics, supra note 212, at 660.
214. David J. Scheffer, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 233, 233 (2001).
215. Id. at 238.
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its jurisdictional boundaries for ICC crimes in any proposed legislation within
these limiting parameters. By mirroring the ICC's own outer limits to its
jurisdiction, the United States does not have to open itself up to be the world's
court for ICC crimes. The United States would be protecting its sovereign
interests by meticulously crafting its jurisdiction over ICC crimes to enable the
United States to assure primacy over any case that the ICC could have an
interest as it pertained to United States nationals, property, and interests. 16
By defining the United States jurisdiction as that equaling the ICC's
jurisdiction over any case in which the United States may have an interest, it
would allay doubt regarding the United States' capability to prosecute the
suspect. Germany decided on very broad universal jurisdiction for the crime of
genocide and, as a result, had to counterbalance the universality for the crime
of genocide with broad prosecutorial discretion in order to assuage the fear of
having the German courts clogged with suits from around the world in search
of a judicial forum. The United Kingdom applied jurisdiction to any United
Kingdom national, resident, or person who is subject to United Kingdom service
of process. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada all require a signature
from the Attorney General to move forward. Broadening the jurisdiction of the
United States federal courts to be able to prosecute all the ICC crimes is a
powerful tool for the United States regardless of whether the United States
ratifies the Rome Statute.
B. United States' Gaps
Title 18 of the United States Code, for example, does not codify crimes
against humanity as such. 217  A domestic federal charge of murder may
theoretically be analogous to the crime against humanity of murder, but may not
technically suffice to assure United States primacy over an ICC indictment. The
elements of the two crimes, Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute and domestic
murder, 18 U.S.C. 1111 (a), are arguably too divergent to satisfy the ICC's
complementarity jurisdiction." 8 Furthermore, domestic murder does not
express the gravity of the alleged crime.1 9
216. Id. Incorporating the four kinds ofjurisdiction possible:
1) territorial,
2) nationality or personality,
3) passive personality, and
4) protective or effects.
217. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091, 2441, 1111.
218. Rome Statute, supra note 2, § 7(l)(a); 18 U.S.C. § 111 (a).
219. Rome Statue, supra note 2, pmbl. (the high threshold of an ICC crime, as the Preamble of the
Rome Statute notes, inter alia, that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the
world).
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Article 7(l)(a) of the Rome Statute deems murder to be a crime against
humanity if certain circumstances are met.2 ' The Elements of Crimes further
defines the crime against humanity of murder to contain an element of a
"widespread or systematic" attack as part of the killing of a human being, and
the perpetrator had to have knowledge that the conduct was part of, or intended
the conduct to be part of, a "widespread or systematic" attack against a civilian
population.22' A simple murder does not constitute a crime against humanity.
The federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. 1 11 (a), states that, "murder is the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. '22 The federal
charge allows for there to be multiple charges of murder, if applicable.223 Yet,
there is no inference or requirement of a "systematic or widespread" attack in
the federal charge. 224 To put it simply, the only commonality between the two
charges is the word murder. The federal charge would technically apply to a
perpetrator of the crime against humanity of murder, but there still remain three
crucial questions which require debate. Those are: 1) whether the federal
charge of murder would suffice to fulfill Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute
and give the United States primacy over ICC jurisdiction; 2) would federal
courts have jurisdiction over the perpetrator, federal courts currently have
jurisdiction only over crimes against humanity committed overseas if they
involve torture, attempted torture, or certain types of international terrorism; 2 1
and 3) whether the federal charge of murder demonstrates, with sufficient
magnitude, the heinous nature of the crime to the international community so
that it rises to the high threshold which the Rome Statute requires.
This is but one example of a single crime in the Rome Statute. There are
many that require a similar examination. With the current United States
Administration's aspiration to disassociate from the ICC in any fashion, whether
the federal charge of murder is sufficient to guarantee primacy over an ICC
220. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(a).
221. See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 81.
222. There can be little doubt that murder in the second degree would not rise to the level of a crime
against humanity because:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every
murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate,
malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage,
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being
other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
18 U.S.C. § Il11(a).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. CASSEL, supra note 1, at 429.
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indictment should ring alarm bells on Capitol Hill. The fundamental question
of whether the federal courts even have jurisdiction over such heinous crimes
should also be the cause of a certain amount of apprehension in Congress.
Regardless of whether the current United States Administration is politically
inclined to participate in the ICC regime or subsequent decisions prove the
current federal law to be (or not to be) sufficient, incorporating analogues to the
Rome Statute Articles 5 through 8 into federal law would have a single and
profound effect. It would assure primacy of United States jurisdiction over any
crime in which the ICC could have an interest. Even passing legislation that
mirrors Articles 5 through 8 of the Rome Statute would not technically
incorporate the United States into the ICC regime. It would simply protect
against the fears currently propagated by the United States.
The current federal genocide statute allows the federal courts to have
jurisdiction only when the crime is committed in the United States or by a
United States national.2 6 For war crimes, United States federal jurisdiction is
also not without its gaps. Only when the victim or the perpetrator is a United
States national or member of the United States military do United States courts
have jurisdiction.2 7 Other states parties to the Rome Statute dealt with the
jurisdictional gaps of their own by expanding the reach of their domestic
jurisdiction. The expansiveness depended on the established legal norms and
what the law would permit.
Whether the federal murder statute properly reflects the heinous nature of
the crime against humanity of murder is debatable. There are persuasive
arguments that the penalties for murder are similar in their gravity, if not more
so, in the United States since the United States can impose the death penalty.
Therefore, if the criminal justice system's punishment is retributive in nature,
there is parity. Since the federal murder statute can be used to charge multiple
murders, a suspected criminal can be dealt with accordingly.
More persuasive, however, are the arguments that the federal murder
statute does not properly reflect the magnitude of the crime against humanity of
murder since the mens rea elements are distinct. In the federal statute:
"Malice aforethought" is the characteristic mark of all murder, as
distinguished from the lesser crime of manslaughter which lacks it.
It does not mean simply hatred or particular ill-will, but extends to
and embraces generally the state of mind with which one commits a
wrongful act. It may be discoverable in a specific deliberate intent to
kill. It is not synonymous with premeditation, however, but may also
be inferred from circumstances that show a wanton and depraved
226. 18 U.S.C. § 1091; CASSEL, supra note 1, at 429-30.
227. 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
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spirit, a mind bent on evil mischief without regard to its
consequences.228
Article 7(1)(a) of the Elements of Crimes states that the mens rea element
is a subjective one and cannot be inferred as the federal statute allows.229 The
perpetrator must know that the killing of a person was part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population and, therefore, the
knowledge requirement is premeditated murder as part of a grand scheme.23°
One cannot know that he/she is going to kill a person as part of a widespread or
systematic attack if one does not already know that he/she is going to kill. 231 The
knowledge and preparation of killing as part of a widespread or systematic
attack is arguably premeditation.232 Not knowing exactly who it is that you are
going to kill is irrelevant.233 Malice aforethought is not synonymous with
premeditation, however, even if the killing were premeditated, because under
the federal statute there is no requirement of a grand scheme of a widespread or
systematic attack.234
There are three requirements for the crime against humanity of murder.235
They are 1) killing; 2) with knowledge (premeditation); and 3) as a part of a
widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population.236 The federal
murder statute has only two criteria: a killing, with malice aforethought.237 The
heinous nature of the ICC crime is manifested in the widespread or systematic
attack on the civilian population. For the reasons stated above, the federal
statute does not arguably rise to the level of "such grave crimes [that] threaten
the peace, security, and well-being of the world '2 38 without there being a
reference to a widespread or systematic plan to kill civilians.
Also, if the purpose of the imprisonment for a crime is rehabilitative in
nature, then the implementation of the death penalty by the United States for
premeditated murder (and the United States argument that the federal murder
statute reflects the heinous nature of the crime against humanity of murder)
228. Gov. of the Virgin Islands v. Lake, 362 F.2d 770, 774 (1966) (defining malice aforethought).
229. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 81, art. 7(1)(a).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 81, art. 7(l)(a).
235. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1).
236. Id.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a).
238. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
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arguably falls short, as no rehabilitation can occur when the convicted person's
sentence is consummated.
Proposed legislation to close the United States' gaps should address these
essential concerns. Below are the beginnings of proposed legislation that would
close the gaps in title 18. The difficulties in providing a launching pad for
proposed legislation is considering the political desire to officially recognize the
ICC. It would be simple and effective to codify the ICC crimes by reference to
Articles 5 through 8 of the Rome Statute and provide for United States federal
jurisdiction accordingly, as many states did in their implementing legislation.
The United States scenario is distinct due to political concerns. Therefore, in
the proposed additions to the current analogues, no reference to the Rome
Statute is made. A reference to the ICC is used to broaden federal personal
jurisdiction with a consent requirement of the Attorney-General.
There is no codified federal analogue for Article 7, "Crimes Against
Humanity." 39 Two solutions are possible, however. The first solution is where
there is a federal crime similar to those included in Article 7 of the Rome
Statute, elements must be included to encompass the requirements of a
"widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population," the
jurisdictional elements of each crime must be broadened to the extent that the
ICC may have jurisdiction, and any additional elements of the crime itself
should be comparatively examined with the ICC Elements of Crimes
requirements. Where there is no federal analogue, for example, the crime of
apartheid, a new crime must be fashioned. The second solution is to draft
proposed legislation that mirrors the crimes in both the Rome Statute and the
ICC Elements of Crimes for crimes against humanity.
1. Genocide
With regard to the jurisdictional limitations of federal courts and the crime
of genocide, a broadening of the federal genocide statute, 18 U.S.C. §1091,
must occur. Additional elements should be added to subsection (d) of § 1091,
which aligns federal jurisdiction with that of the ICC and the definitional
section, §1093. This can be accomplished by simply adding the Attorney
General's consent to additional jurisdictional concerns.
(d) REQUIRED CIRCUMSTANCE FOR OFFENCES.-
The circumstance referred to in subsections (a)
and (c) is that-
1) the offence is committed within the United
States; or
239. Id. art. 7.
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2) the alleged offender is a national of the
United States (as defined in section 101 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101)); or
Additional section 4 3) at the specific direction of the Attorney-
General where the offence is committed
outside the United States by any person;
and
Additional section 4 4) jurisdiction over the offence by the Inter-
national Criminal Court may occur.
Additionally, 18 USC §1093, the definitional section of the federal genocide
statute should be amended to include a definition of the ICC.
(9) The term "International Criminal Court" means the court
constituted by the Rome Statute of 1998.
2. Crimes Against Humanity
There is no federal statute codifying crimes against humanity as such. The
United States has codified various crimes which may (or may not) suffice for
securing United States complementarity jurisdiction, for example, the federal
murder statute (18 U.S.C. § 1111), discussed above, the federal torture statute
(18 U.S.C. §2340A), kidnapping (18 U.S.C. §1201), hostage taking (18 U.S.C.
§ 1203), sexual abuse (18 USC 2241-2245), etc.
A vastly more encompassing statute may be required, as is proposed below.
18 U.S.C. §XOO1-Crimes Against Humanity
(a) Offences.-
(1) In General.-notwithstanding any other section of this
title, it shall be an offence if anyone commits a crime
against humanity if-
(A) as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack, and
(B) the Attorney-General expressly approves; and
(C) jurisdiction over the offence by the International
Criminal Court, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 093(9),
may occur; and
(D) commits an offence in (c).
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(b) Jurisdiction.-There is jurisdiction over the offences in
subsection (a) if-
(1) the offence takes place in the United States and-
(A) the Attorney-General expressly approves; and
(B) jurisdiction over the offence by the International
Criminal Court, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 093(9),
may occur.
(2) the offence takes place outside the United States and-
(A) the Attorney-General expressly approves; and
(B) jurisdiction over the offence by the International
Criminal Court, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 093(9),
may occur.
(c) Definitions.-As used in this section, the ternm-"crime against
humanity" means-murder, extermination, enslavement, depor-
tation, imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, persecution or
any other inhumane act or omission that is committed against
any civilian population or any identifiable group and that, at the
time and in the place of its commission, constitutes a crime
against humanity according to customary international law or
conventional international law or by virtue of its being criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations, whether or not it constitutes a
contravention of the law in force at the time and in the place of
its commission.
3. War Crimes
With regard to the jurisdictional limitations of federal courts and the
federal war crimes statute (18 U.S.C. §2441), recognition of other persons (both
suspects and victims) is required as well as a broadening of the subject matter
jurisdiction. Currently, only when the victim or the perpetrator is a United
States national or member of the United States military do United States courts
have jurisdiction.
(a) Offence. however, whether inside or outside the
United States, commits a war crime, in any of the
circumstances described in subsection (b), shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or
any term of years, or both, and if death results to
the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of
death.
(b) Circumstances. he circumstances referred to in
subsection (a) are that the person committing
such war crime or the victim of such war crime
is:
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New numbering 4
New numbering 4
Additional section 4
Additional section 4
(1) a member of the Armed Forces of the
United States; or
(2) a national of the United States (as defined
in section 101 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act); or
(3) at the specific direction of the Attorney-
General, any person.
(c) Definition. s used in this section the term ar
crime means any conduct
(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the
international convention signed at Geneva
12 August 1949, or any protocol to such
convention to which the United States is a
party;
(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of
the Annex to the Hague Convention IV,
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, signed 18 October 1907;
(3) which constitutes a violation of common
Article 3 of the international convention
signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, or any
protocol to such convention to which the
United Kingdom is a party and which deals
with non-international armed conflict;
(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed
conflict and contray to the provisions of
the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3
May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3
May 1996), when the United States is a
party to such Protocol, willfully kills or
causes serious injury to civilians; or
(5) over which the International Criminal
Court, as defined in 18 USC 093(9), may
have jurisdiction.
C. Conclusion
The United States has codified a patchwork of international crimes, some
of which are contained in the Rome Statute. However, the patchwork is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction to United States courts for the full range of
2005]
228 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 12:183
ICC crimes. The purpose of the United States in legislating crimes analogous
to Articles 5 through 8 of the Rome Statute would be to satisfy Article 17 and
18 of the Rome Statute and supplant ICC jurisdiction, thus assuring United
States primacy over all ICC investigations and prosecutions of persons accused
of an ICC crime regardless of the nationality of the suspect or victim.
As this paper has examined, many states prior to ratification of the Rome
Statute were in ostensibly the same situation as the United States currently finds
itself. No state had established the legal framework sufficient to guarantee
primacy over an ICC investigation or prosecution. Australia for the first time
codified the crime of genocide during the ICC ratification process and Germany
first legislated war crimes and crimes against humanity during the ICC
ratification process. Canada used the ICC ratification process to revamp its
criminal code which had previously codified war crimes and crimes against
humanity but the Canadian courts found them too difficult to domestically
prosecute. While the United States has the crime of genocide on the books, the
jurisdictional limitations of the current law do not allow for prosecution of non-
United States citizens who have allegedly committed genocide overseas and
who may be in the United States, or if the alleged perpetrator is an American
citizen.
Germany chose to legislate universal jurisdiction with few if any
limitations imposed, relying on prosecutorial discretion to not overburden the
courts with suits from around the world. Canada ultimately decided on
universal jurisdiction but added a presence requirement, made the application
of the crimes retrospective, and required the Attorney General's signature.
2 40
This assures that the Canadian jurisprudential principles and constitutional
limits of due process are protected. Australia also decided to apply universal
jurisdiction to ICC crimes to assure its courts ofjurisdiction, but decided against
making the crime of genocide retrospective due to past Australian governmental
policies of mistreatment of indigenous Australians. The United Kingdom
broadened its extradition law so that it could extradite to a third-party state a
suspect who has been accused of the crime of genocide, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity.241 The suspect can be either a United Kingdom citizen,
resident, or somehow subject to United Kingdom service of process jurisdiction,
and has allegedly committed any of the ICC crimes either inside or outside of
the United Kingdom.
2 42
However, many of the ICC crimes had already been codified by the United
Kingdom Parliament, and the concern in London was whether the incorporation
of those previously legislated crimes would suffice for ratification purposes of
240. See CAHWCA, supra note 20 (Canada's ratification of the ICC and its domestic legislation).
241. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, § 51(2)(b).
242. Id.
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the Rome Statute.243 The United Kingdom decided not to assume that they
would suffice, and incorporated the ICC crimes in the most efficient and
unquestionable manner by referencing the Rome Statute directly.
Each state has uniquely implemented the Rome Statute. Due to the fear of
historical governmental actions, constitutional hurdles, established jurispru-
dential norms, and political maneuvering, the Rome Statute has proven flexible
enough to incorporate individual state's concerns yet still implement the most
comprehensive codification of international criminal statutes to exist.
The United States can utilize the full array of approaches that the other
ratifying states took to construct legislation that will close the gaps in title 18,
thus protecting United States' interests without the necessity of ratifying the
Rome Statute. When the political motivation emerges to do so, the ratification
process would then entail few, if any, modifications of domestic law, thus
expediting United States involvement in the future administration of the ICC.
Even if the United States were to adamantly decide to never ratify the Rome
Statute, by closing the gaps in title 18, the United States can assure primacy
over any ICC investigation and prosecution, thus protecting its sovereign
interests.
All the states that have ratified the Rome Statute, even those with seeming-
ly insurmountable constitutional jurisprudence have apparently been satisfied
with the principle of complementarity to resolve doubts and fears regarding
violations of sovereignty. As the American perspective on the ICC becomes
more and more isolationist based on fears which other western democracies
have overcome, the United States will find itself more in the focus of the ICC
as a non-member.
Finally, if the ICC were to promulgate judicial activism or deprive litigants
of well-reasoned justice, the other state parties and democracies would cease to
adhere to the ICC findings and the ICC would quickly become irrelevant and a
footnote in a textbook detailing its failed attempt to administer international
criminal justice. The ICC is dependent on the voluntary association of the
member states. In the meantime, the United States can protect its national
interests and its sovereignty by legislating the crimes contained in the Rome
Statute and still remain an outsider to the ICC.
V. ANNEXES
The annexes below have been compiled for the ease of the reader to
examine the various approaches the different states took to implementing the
Rome Statute. The annexes below are the author's own effort at correlating the
various national statutes with the Rome Statute. The German statute below of
243. See Progress Report by the U.K, supra note 97.
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the implementing legislation is a translation and not considered an official
version. Articles 6 through 8 of the Rome Statute are not reproduced in every
case, as they are extensive. A simple reference to the Article in question is
provided in its stead.
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ANNEX 1-CANADA
Crimes Against Humanity War
Crimes Act
Section 3
This Act is binding on Her Majesty in
right of Canada or a province.
(c) a war crime.
Rome Statute
Article 5
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall
be limited to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international
community as a whole. The Court
has jurisdiction in accordance with
this Statute with respect to the
following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
Rome Statute
Article 27 Irrelevance of official
capacity
1. This Statute shall apply equally to
all persons without any distinction
based on official capacity. In parti-
cular, official capacity as a Head of
State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected
representative or a government official
shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself,
constitute a ground for reduction of
sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural
rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under
national or international law, shall not
bar the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person.
Crimes Against Humanity WarCrimes Against Humanity War
Crimes Act
Section 4(1)
4. (1) Every person is guilty of an
indictable
offence who commits
(a) genocide;
(b) a crime against humanity;
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Crimes Against Humanity War
Crimes Act
Section 4(3)
"crime against humanity" means
murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture,
sexual violence, persecution or any
other inhumane act or omission that
is committed against any civilian
population or any identifiable group
and that, at the time and in the place
of its commission, constitutes a
crime against humanity according to
customary international law or con-
ventional international law or by
virtue of its being criminal according
to the general principles of law
recognized by the community of
nations, whether or not it constitutes
a contravention of the law in force at
the time and in the place of its
commission.
Section 4(3)
"genocide means an act or omission
committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, an identifiable
group of persons, as such, that, at the
time and in the place of its
commission, constitutes genocide
according to customary international
law or conventional international law
or by virtue of its being criminal
according to the general principles of
law recognized by the community of
nations, whether or not it constitutes
a contravention of the law in force at
the time and in the place of its
commission.
Rome Statute
Article 7 Crimes against humanity
1. For the purpose of this Statute,
"crime against humanity" means any
of the following acts when com-
mitted as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Exter-
mination; (c) Enslavement; (d) De-
portation or forcible transfer of pop-
ulation; (e) Imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty
in violation of fundamental rules of
international law; (f) Torture; (g)
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prosti-
tution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable
gravity; (h) Persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, gender as defined
in paragraph 3, or other grounds that
are universally recognized as imper-
missible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in
this paragraph or any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court; (i)
Enforced disappearance of persons;
() The crime of apartheid; (k) Other
inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental
or physical health.
Article 6 Genocide
For the purpose of this Statute,
"genocide" means any of the
2005] HatchellSection 4(3)
''war crime" means an act or
omission committed during an armed
conflict that, at the time and in the
place of its commission, constitutes
a war crime according to customary
international law or conventional
international law applicable to armed
conflicts, whether or not it consti-
tutes a contravention of the law in
force at the time and in the place of
its commission.
following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such: (a) Killing members
of the group; (b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of
the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; (d)
Imposing measures intended to pre-
vent births within the group; (e)
Forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.
Article 8 War crimes
2. For the purpose of this Statute,
"war crimes" means: (a) Grave
breaches of the Geneva Convention
of 12 August 1949, namely, any of
the following acts against persons or
property protected under the provi-
sions of the relevant Geneva Conven-
tion: (i) Willful killing; (ii) Torture or
inhuman treatment, including biolo-
gical experiments; (iii) Willfully
causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or health; (iv) Exten-
sive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly; (v) Compelling a
prisoner of war or other protected
person to serve in the forces of a
hostile Power; (vi) Willfully depriv-
ing a prisoner of war or other pro-
tected person of the rights of fair and
regular trial; (vii) Unlawful depor-
tation or transfer or unlawful confine-
ment;
(viii) Taking of hostages.
2005] Hatchell
234 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 12:183
(b) Other serious violations of the
laws and customs applicable in inter-
national armed conflict, within the
established framework of inter-
national law, namely, any of the
following acts: (i)...
Crimes Against Humanity War Rome Statute
Crimes Act
Section 4(4) Article 10
For greater certainty, crimes Nothing in this Part shall be inter-
described in Articles 6 and 7 and preted as limiting or prejudicing in
paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Rome any way existing or developing rules
Statute are, as of July 17, 1998, of international law for purposes
crimes according to customary inter- other than this Statute.
national law. This does not limit or
prejudice in any way the application
of existing or developing rules of
international law.
Crimes Against Humanity War Rome Statute
Crimes Act
Section 5(1) Article 28
A military commander commits an In addition to other grounds of
indictable offence if criminal responsibility under this
(a) the military commander Statute for crimes within the
(i) fails to exercise control properly jurisdiction of the Court:
over a person under their effective (a) A military commander or person
command and control or effective effectively acting as a military
authority and control, and as a result commander shall be criminally
the person commits an offence under responsible for crimes within the
section 4, or jurisdiction of the Court committed
(ii) fails, after the coming into force by forces under his or her effective
of this section, to exercise control command and control, or effective
properly over a person under their authority and control as the case may
effective command and control or be, as a result of his or her failure to
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effective authority and control, and
as a result the person commits an
offence under section 6;
(b) the military commander knows,
or is criminally negligent in failing to
know, that the person is about to
commit or is committing such an
offence; and
(c) the military commander subse-
quently
(i) fails to take, as soon as practic-
able, all necessary and reasonable
measures within their power to
prevent or repress the commission of
the offence, or the further commis-
sion of offences under section 4 or 6,
or
(ii) fails to take, as soon as practic-
able, all necessary and reasonable
measures within their power to
submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and
prosecution.
(2) A superior commits an indictable
offence if
(a) the superior
(i) fails to exercise control properly
over a person under their effective
authority and control, and as a result
the person commits an offence under
section 4, or(ii) fails, after the
coming into force of this section, to
exercise control properly over a
person under their effective authority
and control, and as a result the
person commits an offence under
section 6;(b) the superior knows that
the person is about to commit or is
committing such an offence, or
consciously disregards information
that clearly indicates that such an
offence is about to be committed or
exercise control properly over such
forces, where: (i) That military
commander or person either knew or,
owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that the
forces were committing or about to
commit such crimes; and (ii) That
military commander or person failed
to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission
or to submit the matter to the com-
petent authorities for investigation
and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and
subordinate relationships not des-
cribed in paragraph (a), a superior
shall be criminally responsible for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court committed by subordinates
under his or her effective authority
and control, as a result of his or her
failure to exercise control properly
over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or
consciously disregarded information
which clearly indicated, that the
subordinates were committing or
about to commit such crimes; (ii)
The crimes concerned activities that
were within the effective
responsibility and control of the
superior; and (iii) The superior failed
to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission
or to submit the matter to the com-
petent authorities for investigation
and prosecution.
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is being committed by the person;
(c) the offence relates to activities for
which the superior has effective
authority and control; and
(d) the superior subsequently
(i) fails to take, as soon as practic-
able, all necessary and reasonable
measures within their power to
prevent or repress the commission of
the offence, or the further commis-
sion of offences under section 4 or 6,
or
(ii) fails to take, as soon as practic-
able, all necessary and reasonable
measures within their power to
submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and
prosecution.
Crimes Against Humanity War
Crimes Act
Section 8
A person who is alleged to have
committed an offence under section 6
or 7 may be prosecuted for that
offence if
(a) at the time the offence is alleged
to have been committed,
(i) the person was a Canadian citizen
or was employed by Canada in a
civilian or military capacity,
(ii) the person was a citizen of a state
that was engaged in an armed conflict
against Canada, or was employed in
a civilian or military capacity by such
a state,
(iii) the victim of the alleged offence
was a Canadian citizen, or
(iv) the victim of the alleged offence
was a citizen of a state that was allied
Rome Statute
Article 11 Jurisdiction ratione
temporis
1. The Court has jurisdiction only
with respect to crimes committed
after the entry into force of this
Statute.
2. If a State becomes a Party to this
Statute after its entry into force, the
Court may exercise its jurisdiction
only with respect to crimes
committed after the entry into force
of this Statute for that State, unless
that State has made a declaration
under Article 12, paragraph 3.
[Vol. 12:183
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Annex 2- Australia
ICCCA
268.3 Genocide by killing
(1) A person (the perpetrator) com-
mits an offence if: (a) the perpetrator
causes the death of one or more
persons; and (b) the person or
persons belong to a particular
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group; and (c) the perpetrator intends
to destroy, in whole or in part, that
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such.
268.4 Genocide by causing serious
bodily or mental harm
(1) A person (the perpetrator)
commits an offence if: (a) the
perpetrator causes serious bodily or
mental harm to one or more person;
Rome Statute
Article 6 Genocide
For the purpose of this Statute,
"genocide" means any of the
following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.
with Canada in an armed conflict; or
(b) after the time the offence is
alleged to have been committed, the
person is present in Canada.
Section 9
(1) Proceedings for an offence under
this Act alleged to have been
committed outside Canada for which
a person may be prosecuted under
this Act may, whether or not the
person is in Canada, be commenced
in any territorial division in Canada
and the person may be tried and
punished in respect of that offence in
the same manner as if the offence had
been committed in that territorial
division.
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and (b) the person or persons belong
to a particular national, ethnical,
racial or religious group; and (c) the
perpetrator intends to destroy, in
whole or in part, that national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such.
268.5 Genocide by deliberately
inflicting conditions of life calculated
to bring about physical destruction
(1) A person (the perpetrator)
commits an offence if: (a) the
perpetrator inflict certain conditions
of life upon one or more persons; and
(b) the person or persons belong to a
particular national, ethnical, racial or
religious group; and (c) the
perpetrator intends to destroy, in
whole or in part, that national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such; and (d) the conditions of life
are intended to bring about the
physical destruction of that group, in
whole or in part.
268.6 Genocide by imposing
measures intended to prevent births
(1) A person (the perpetrator) com-
mits an offence if: (a) the perpetrator
imposes certain measures upon one
or more persons; and (b) the person
or persons belong to a particular
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group; and (c) the perpetrator intends
to destroy, in whole or in part, that
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such; and (d) the measures
imposed are intended to prevent
births within that group.
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268.7 Genocide by forcibly
transferring children
(1) A person (the perpetrator)
commits an offence if: (a) the
perpetrator forcibly transfers one or
more persons; and (b) the person or
persons belong to a particular
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group; and (c) the perpetrator intends
to destroy, in whole or in part, that
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such; and (d) the transfer is
from one group to another national,
ethnical, racial or religious group;
and (e) the person or persons are
under the age of 18 years; and (f) the
perpetrator knows that, or is reckless
as to whether, the person or persons
are under that age.
Annex 3 - United Kingdom
ICC Act 2001-Part 5
50-Meaning of "genocide", "crime
against humanity" and "war crime"
(1) In this Part-
"genocide" means an act of genocide
as defined in Article 6,
"crime against humanity" means a
crime against humanity as defined in
Article 7, and
"war crime" means a war crime as
defined in Article 8.2.
Rome Statute
Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Rome Statute
and corresponding Articles of the
Elements of Crimes.
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(2) In interpreting and applying the
provisions of those Articles the court
shall take into account-
(a) any relevant Elements of Crimes
adopted in accordance with Article 9,
and
(b) until such time as Elements of
Crimes are adopted under that
Article, any relevant Elements of
Crimes contained in the report of the
Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court adopted
on 30th June 2000.
ICC Act 2001-Part 5
51-Genocide, crime against
humanity and war crimes
(1) It is an offence against the law of
England and Wales for a person to
commit genocide, a crime against
humanity or a war crime.
(2) This section applies to acts
committed-
(a) in England or Wales, or
(b) outside the United Kingdom by a
United Kingdom national, a United
Kingdom resident or a person subject
to UK service jurisdiction.
Rome Statute
No corresponding Article
ICC Act 2001 Rome Statute
72 xtradition: exception to dual No corresponding Article
criminality rule under the 1989 Act
(1) Section 2 of the Extradition Act
1989 (meaning of xtradition crime
is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(b) (extra-
territorial offences), after sub-
paragraph (ii) add or
(iii) the condition specified in
subsection (3A) below. (3) After
subsection (3) insert-
(3A) The condition mentioned in
subsection (1)(b)(iii) above is that
the conduct constituting the offence
constitutes or, if committed in the
United Kingdom would constitute-
(a) an offence under section 51 or 58
of the International Criminal Court
Act 2001 (genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes),
(b) an offence under section 52 or 59
of that Act (conduct ancillary to
genocide etc. committed outside the
jurisdiction), or
(c) an ancillary offence, as defined in
section 55 or 62 of that Act, in
relation to any such offence.
Annex 4 - Germany
Code of Crimes
International Law
against
Section 6- Genocide
(1) Whoever with the intent of
destroying as such, in whole or in
part, a national, racial, religious or
ethnic group
1. kills a member of the group
2. causes serious bodily or mental
harm to a member of the group,
especially of the kind referred to in
section 226 of the criminal code,
3. inflicts on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about their
physical destruction in whole or in
part,
4. imposes measures intended to
Rome Statute
Article 6-Genocide
For the purpose of this Statute,
"genocide" means any of the
following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group;
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prevent births within the group,
5. forcibly transfers a child of the
group to another group shall be
punished with imprisonment for life.
Code of Crimes
International Law
against
Section 7 Crimes against Humanity
(1) Whoever, as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population,
1. kills a person,
2. inflicts, with the intent of destroy-
ing a population in whole or in part,
conditions of life on that population
or on parts thereof, being conditions
calculated to bring about its physical
destruction on whole or in part,
3. traffics in persons, particularly in
women or children, or whoever
enslaves a person in another way and
in doing so arrogates to himself a
right of ownership over that person,
4. deports or forcibly transfers, by
expulsion or other coercive acts, a
person lawfully present in an area to
another State or another area in
contravention of a general rule of
international law,
5. tortures a person in his or her
custody or otherwise under his or her
control by causing that person
substantial physical or mental harm
or suffering where such harm or
suffering does not arise only from
sanctions that are compatible with
international law,
6. sexually coerces, rapes, forces into
prostitution or deprives a person of
his or her reproductive capacity, or
confines a woman forcibly made
(e) Forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.
Rome Statute
Article 7 Crimes against humanity
1. For the purpose of this Statute,
rime against humanity means any of
the following acts when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the
attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer
of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of
international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other
form of sexual violence of compar-
able gravity;
(h) Persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, gender as defined
in paragraph 3, or other grounds that
are universally recognized as
impermissible under international
law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of
persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
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pregnant with the intent of affecting
the ethnic composition of any
population,
7. causes a person enforced dis-
appearance, with the intention of
removing him or her from the
protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time,
(a) by abducting that person on
behalf of or with the approval of a
State or a political organization, or by
otherwise severely depriving such
person of his or her physical liberty,
followed by a failure immediately to
give truthful information, upon
inquiry, on that person fate or
whereabouts, or
(b) by refusing, on behalf of a State
or of a political organization or in
contravention of a legal duty, to give
information immediately on the fate
and whereabouts of the person
deprived of his or her physical liberty
under the circumstances referred to
under letter (a) above, or by giving
false information thereon,
8. causes another person severe
physical or mental harm, especially
of the kind referred to in section 226
of the Criminal Code,
9. Severely deprives, in contravention
of a general rule of international law,
a person of his or her physical liberty,
or
10. persecutes an identifiable group
or collectivity by depriving such
group or collectivity of fundamental
human rights, or by substantially
restricting the same, on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural or
religious, gender or other grounds
that are recognized as impermissible
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar
character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body
or to mental or physical health.
Rome Statute
Article 8-War crimes
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction
in respect of war crimes in particular
when committed as part of a plan or
policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes.
2. For the purpose of this Statute,
"war crimes" means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely, any of the following acts
against persons or property protected
under the provisions of the relevant
Geneva Convention:
(i) Willful killing;
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments;
(iii) Willfully causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body
or health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or
other protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile Power;
(vi) Willfully depriving a prisoner of
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under general rules of international
law ....
Code of Crimes against Inter-
national Law
Section 8- War crimes against
persons
(1) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character
1. kills a person who is to be pro-
tected under international humani-
tarian law,
2. takes hostage a person who is to be
protected under international
humanitarian law,
3. treats a person who is to be
protected under international
humanitarian law cruelly or
inhumanly by causing him or her
substantial physical or mental harm
or suffering, especially by torturing
or mutilating that person,
4. sexually coerces, rapes, forces into
prostitution or deprives a person who
is to be protected under international
humanitarian law of his or her
reproductive capacity, or confines a
woman forcibly made pregnant with
the intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of any population,
5. conscripts children under the age
of fifteen years into the armed forces,
or enlists them in the armed forces or
in armed groups, or uses them to
participate actively in hostilities,
6. deports or forcibly transfers, by
expulsion or other coercive acts, a
person who is to be protected under
international humanitarian law and
war or other protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial;
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer
or unlawful confinement;
(viii) Taking of hostages.
(b) Other serious violations of the
laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within
the established framework of inter-
national law, namely, any of the
following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks
against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians
not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks
against civilian objects, that is,
objects which are not military
objectives
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks
against personnel, installations,
material, units or vehicles involved
in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission in accordance
with the Charter of the United
Nations, as long as they are entitled
to the protection given to civilians or
civilian objects under the inter-
national law of armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack
in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or
injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by
whatever means, towns, villages,
dwellings or buildings which are
2005] Hatchelllawfully present in an area to another
State or another area in contravention
of a general rule of international law,
7. imposes on, or executes a sub-
stantial sentence in respect of a
person who is to be protected under
international humanitarian law, in
particular the death penalty or
imprisonment, without that person
having been sentenced in a fair and
regular trial affording the legal
guarantees required by international
law,
8. exposes a person who is to be
protected under international
humanitarian law to the risk of death
or of serious injury to health
(a) by carrying out experiments on
such a person , being a person who
has not previously given his or her
voluntary and express consent, or
where the experiments concerned are
neither medically necessary nor
carried out in his or her interest,
(b) by taking body tissue or organs
from such a person for
transplantation purposes so far as it
does not constitute removal of blood
or skin for therapeutic purposes in
conformity with generally recognized
medical principles and the person
concerned has previously not given
his or her voluntary and express
consent, or
(c) by using treatment methods that
are not medically recognized on such
person, without this being necessary
from a medical point of view and
without the person concerned having
previously given his or her voluntary
and express consent, or
9. treats a person who is to be
undefended and which are not
military objectives;
(vi) Killing or wounding a comba-
tant who, having laid down his arms
or having no longer means of
defense, has surrendered at
discretion;
(vii) Making improper use of a flag
of truce, of the flag or of the military
insignia and uniform of the enemy or
of the United Nations, as well as of
the distinctive emblems of the
Geneva Conventions, resulting in
death or serious personal injury;
(viii) The transfer, directly or
indirectly, by the Occupying Power
of parts of its own civilian popula-
tion into the territory it occupies, or
the deportation or transfer of all or
parts of the population of the
occupied territory within or outside
this territory;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks
against buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places
where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not
military objectives;
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the
power of an adverse party to
physical mutilation or to medical or
scientific experiments of any kind
which are neither justified by the
medical, dental or hospital treatment
of the person concerned nor carried
out in his or her interest, and which
cause death to or seriously endanger
the health of such person or persons;
(xi) Killing or wounding
treacherously individuals belonging
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protected under international
humanitarian law in a gravely
humiliating or degrading manner
shall be punished, in the cases
referred to under number 1, with
imprisonment for life, in the cases
referred to under number 2, with
imprisonment for not less than five
years, in the cases referred to under
numbers 3 to 5, with imprisonment
for not less than three years, in the
cases referred to under numbers 6 to
8, with imprisonment for not less
than two years, and, in the cases
referred to under number 9, with
imprisonment for not less than one
year.
(2) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character, wounds a member
of the adverse armed forces or a
combatant of the adverse party after
the latter has surrendered uncondi-
tionally or is otherwise placed hors
de combat shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than three
years.
(3) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict
1. unlawfully holds as a prisoner or
unjustifiably delays the return home
of a protected person within the
meaning of subsection (6), number 1,
2. transfers, as a member of an
Occupying Power, parts of its own
civilian population into the occupied
territory,
3. compels a protected person within
the meaning of subsection (6),
number 1, by force or threat of
appreciable harm to serve in the
to the hostile nation or army;
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will
be given;
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the
enemy's property unless such
destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war;
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended
or inadmissible in a court of law the
rights and actions of the nationals of
the hostile party;
(xv) Compelling the nationals of the
hostile party to take part in the
operations of war directed against
their own country, even if they were
in the belligerent's service before the
commencement of the war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even
when taken by assault;
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned
weapons;
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or
devices;
(xix) Employing bullets which
expand or flatten easily in the human
body, such as bullets with a hard
envelope which does not entirely
cover the core or is pierced with
incisions;
(xx) Employing weapons, projectiles
and material and methods of warfare
which are of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering or which are inherently
indiscriminate in violation of the
international law of armed conflict,
provided that such weapons,
projectiles and material and methods
of warfare are the subject of a
Hatchell
forces of a hostile Power or
4. compels a national of the adverse
party by force or threat of appreciable
harm to take part in the operations of
war directed against his or her own
country shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than two
years.
(4) Where the perpetrator causes the
death of the victim through an
offence pursuant to subscction (1),
numbers 2 to 6, the punishment shall,
in the cases referred to under sub-
section (1), number 2, be imprison-
ment for life or imprisonment for not
less than ten years, in the cases
referred to under subsection (1),
numbers 3 to 5, imprisonment for not
less than five years, and, in the cases
referred to under subsection (1),
number 6, imprisonment for not less
than three years. Where an act
referred to under subsection (1),
number 8, causes death or serious
harm to health, the punishment shall
be imprisonment for not less than
three years.
(5) In less serious cases referred to
under subsection (1), number 2, the
punishment shall be imprisonment
for not less than two years, in less
serious cases referred to under
subsection (1), numbers 3 and 4, and
under subsection (2) the punishment
shall be imprisonment for not less
than one year, in less serious cases
referred to under subsection (1),
number 6,and under subsection (3),
number 1, the punishment shall be
imprisonment from six months to
five years.
comprehensive prohibition and are
included in an annex to this Statute,
by an amendment in accordance with
the relevant provisions set forth in
Articles 121 and 123;
(xxi) Committing outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, as defined in Article 7,
paragraph 2 (f), enforced
sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence also constituting a
grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions;
(xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a
civilian or other protected person to
render certain points, areas or
military forces immune from
military operations;
(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks
against buildings, material, medical
units and transport, and personnel
using the distinctive emblems of the
Geneva Convention in conformity
with international law;
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation
of civilians as a method of warfare
by depriving them of objects
indispensable to their survival,
including willfully impeding relief
supplies as provided for under the
Geneva Convention;
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting
children under the age of fifteen
years into the national armed forces
or using them to participate actively
in hostilities
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(6) Persons who are to be protected
under international humanitarian law
shall be
1. in an international armed conflict:
persons protected for the purposes of
the Geneva Convention and of the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Convention (Protocol I) (annexed to
this Act), namely the wounded, the
sick, the shipwrecked, prisoners of
war and civilians;
2. in an armed conflict not of an
international character: the wounded,
the sick, the shipwrecked as well as
persons taking no active part in the
hostilities who are in the power of the
adverse party;
3. in an international armed conflict
and in an armed conflict not of an
international character: members of
armed forces and combatants of the
adverse party, both of whom have
laid down their arms or have no other
means of defense.
Section 9-War crimes against
property and other rights
(1) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character pillages or, unless
this is imperatively demanded by the
necessities of the armed conflict,
otherwise extensively destroys,
appropriates or seizes property of the
adverse party contrary to inter-
national law, such property being in
the power of the perpetrator's party,
shall be punished with imprisonment
from one to ten years.
(2) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict and
contrary to international law declares
the rights and actions of all, or of a
substantial proportion of, the nation-
als of the hostile party abolished,
suspended or inadmissible in a court
of law shall be punished with im-
prisonment from one to ten years.
Section 10-War crimes against
humanitarian operations and
emblems
(1) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character
1. directs an attack against personnel,
installations, material, units or
vehicles involved in a humanitarian
assistance or peacekeeping mission in
accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, as long as they are
entitled to the protection given to
civilians or civilian objects under
international humanitarian law, or
2. directs an attack against personnel,
buildings, material, medical units and
transport, using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Convention
in conformity with international
humanitarian law shall be punished
with imprisonment for not less than
three years. In less serious cases,
particularly where the attack does not
take place by military means, the
punishment shall be imprisonment
for not less than one year.
(2) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character makes improper
use of the distinctive emblems of the
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Geneva Convention, of the flag of
truce, of the flag or of the military
insignia or of the uniform of the
enemy or of the United Nations,
thereby causing a person's death or
serious personal injury (section 226
of the Criminal Code) shall be
punished with imprisonment for not
less than five years.
Section 11-War crimes consisting
in the use of prohibited methods of
warfare
(1) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character
1. directs an attack by military means
against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians
not taking direct part in hostilities,
2. directs an attack by military means
against civilian objects, so long as
these objects are protected as such by
international humanitarian law,
namely buildings dedicated to reli-
gion, education, art, science or charit-
able purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick
and wounded are collected, or against
undefended towns, villages, dwell-
ings or buildings, or against
demilitarized zones, or against works
and installations containing danger-
ous forces,
3. carries out an attack by military
means and definitely anticipates that
the attack will cause death or injury
to civilians or damage to civilian
objects on a scale out of proportion to
the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated,
4. uses a person who is to be pro-
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tected under international humani-
tarian law as a shield to restrain a
hostile party from undertaking opera-
tions of war against certain targets,
5. uses starvation of civilians as a
method of warfare by depriving them
of objects indispensable to their
survival or impedes relief supplies in
contravention of international
humanitarian law,
6. orders or threatens, as a com-
mander, that no quarter will be given,
or
7. treacherously kills or wounds a
member of the hostile armed forces
or a combatant of the adverse party
shall be punished with imprisonment
for not less than three years. In less
serious cases under number 2 the
punishment shall be imprisonment
for not less than one year.
(2) Where the perpetrator causes the
death or serious injury of a civilian
(section 226 of the Criminal Code) or
of a person who is to be protected
under international humanitarian law
through an offence pursuant to sub-
section (1), numbers I to 6, he shall
be punished with imprisonment for
not less than five years. Where the
perpetrator intentionally causes
death, the punishment shall be impri-
sonment for life or for not less than
ten years.
(3) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict carries
out an attack by military means and
definitely anticipates that the attack
will cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environ-
ment on a scale out of proportion to
the concrete and direct overall
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military advantage anticipated shall
be punished with imprisonment for
not less than three years.
